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Abstract 
Changes in memory and concerns regarding memory performance are 
common in older people, with many fearing developing dementia. Older people both 
with and without objective memory impairment may engage in compensatory 
strategies to reduce feelings of uncertainty, including checking or a reliance on 
memory aids. However, a number of studies have demonstrated that checking may 
paradoxically lead to reductions in metamemory (memory confidence, vividness and 
detail) as well as potential reductions in memory accuracy.  
The present study aimed to build upon previous research by adapting a stove 
paradigm developed by Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault (2006) to investigate the 
effects of repeated ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ checking on memory accuracy and 
metamemory in 20 community dwelling older people without memory problems, as 
well as a smaller sample of 14 individuals with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). 
 The study employed 2 x 2 mixed factorial experimental designs for both 
samples. The independent variable was checking type (relevant checking and 
irrelevant checking). Participants were randomly assigned to either a ‘relevant 
checking’ or an ‘irrelevant checking’ condition. Participants in the ‘relevant 
checking’ condition completed 15 ‘checks’ of a non-functional replica stove while 
those in the ‘irrelevant checking’ condition completed 15 ‘checks’ of a dosette box, 
before completing a final checking trial of the stove. The dependent variables were 
measures of memory accuracy and metamemory (confidence, vividness and detail) 
assessed at two time points (pre-checking and post-checking). 
Consistent with earlier findings, repeated relevant checking led to significant 
decline in memory confidence, vividness and detail compared to the irrelevant 
checking condition for the older adult sample. The MCI sample showed significant 
decline in memory confidence following repeated checking although declines in 
vividness and detail did not reach significance. No change was observed in memory 
accuracy in either sample. The clinical and theoretical implications of this finding 
are discussed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Ageing in the UK 
Consistent with global demographic projections, the UK has an increasingly 
aging population and there are currently 11.4 million people aged over 65 years in 
the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2013), a figure that is expected to rise to over 
16 million in the next 15 years. Moreover, the number of people aged over 85 years 
currently stands at over 1.5 million and is expected to double within the next 20 
years (Office for National Statistics, 2013; 2015a). Current estimates for life 
expectancy at birth in the UK are 83.0 years for women and 79.3 years for men 
(Office for National Statistics, 2015b). Of people aged over 65 years in the UK 3.5 
million live alone, the majority of whom, 70 %, are women (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013).  
There are numerous challenges that older people may experience as they age 
which can impact quality of life, including changes to health status resulting in 
functional limitations (Stuck et al., 1999), more limited opportunities for social 
engagement (Wenger, 1997), and changes to cognitive functioning (Muangpaisan, 
Assantachai, Intalapaporn, & Pisansalakij, 2008; Salthouse, 2003). In spite of these 
challenges, research suggests normal ageing is perceived as a generally positive 
experience, with people aged 65 to 79 reporting the highest average levels of 
personal well-being and life satisfaction among all age groups in a survey conducted 
in the UK by the Office of Nation Statistics (ONS, 2016). 
There is emerging evidence suggesting that concerns around cognitive 
functioning may be relatively widespread amongst older people (Jonkers, Geerlings 
& Schmand, 2000; Mitchell, 2008) and have been shown to be linked to reduced 
memory self-efficacy (Ramakers et al., 2009) and quality of life (Mol et al., 2007). 
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Jonkers and colleagues (2000) in a review of the literature showed that depending on 
the sampling methods used, between 25-50% of community dwelling older adults 
aged over 65 reported everyday memory performance to have declined compared to 
earlier functioning. A meta-analysis showed that even in the absence of objective 
memory difficulties, around 17% of community older adults reported subjective 
memory complaints (Mitchell, 2008). It is important to note when interpreting these 
findings that these studies did not provide evidence of the type of errors people were 
making, their impact or the interpretation of this perceived memory decline. Beliefs 
about the causation of memory difficulties have been shown to predict attendance at 
memory clinics, with individuals who believe their difficulties are pathological 
(Hurt, Burns, Brown & Barrowclough, 2011), as well as those with a close relative 
diagnosed with a dementia, or those with greater knowledge of dementia (Hodgson 
& Cutler, 2004) being more likely to seek formal help. This would suggest that as 
awareness of dementia increases, individuals who previously may have viewed 
declines in everyday memory performance as part of the normal aging process may 
now be more likely to view these as the signs of a pathological process. 
Research has begun to focus on the prevalence and the possible adaptive as 
well as maladaptive consequences of anticipatory anxiety of developing dementia 
(French et al., 2012; Kessler, Bowen, Baer, Froelich & Wahl, 2012). A UK 
government survey indicated that 39% of respondents over the age of 55 reported 
fearing developing dementia more than any other major life-threatening condition, 
including cancer, heart disease, stroke and diabetes (Department of Health, 2013). 
Cutler and Hodgson (2001) showed that anxieties about developing dementia are 
common with 47% of cognitively healthy 40-60 year olds without a parental history 
of dementia reporting either being ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned about developing 
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Alzheimer’s disease, this rose to 92% for those with a living parent who had been 
diagnosed with dementia. Suhr & Kinkela (2007) reported in a sample of healthy 
adults aged 50 to 85 years that fear of dementia is particularly pronounced in 
individuals with personal experience of caring for someone with dementia, those 
who score higher on measures of depression, individuals who perceive their memory 
functioning to be poorer, and those with more negative aging stereotypes. These 
studies investigated anxiety of developing dementia utilising a single question and 
likert scale response, there may however be large variation in the frequency or 
preoccupation with worry, evaluation of likelihood or when they worry it would 
develop meaning they may overestimate the current perceived threat in these 
individuals. Limited research exists on the potential consequences of dementia 
worry, however it has been associated with poorer wellbeing (Hodgson & Cutler, 
1997) as well as higher levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms (Kinzer & Suhr, 
2015). It has been suggested that anxiety about developing dementia may share 
similarities with the cognitive model of health anxiety proposed by Warwick and 
Salkovskis (1990), potentially affecting how an individual perceives their cognitive 
functioning as well as their likelihood of interpreting memory lapses and episodes of 
forgetting as indicative of dementia (Kessler et al., 2012). 
1.2 Memory Changes Associated with Ageing 
1.2.1 Dementia 
Dementia is an umbrella term used for a number of degenerative neurological 
conditions (Lobo et al., 2000), the most common of which are Alzheimer’s disease 
which accounts for about 62% of all dementias, Vascular dementia which accounts 
for 17%, Lewy-body dementia which accounts for 4% and Fronto-temporal dementia 
which accounts for 2% of dementias (Alzheimer's Society, 2014). A further 10% of 
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dementias are mixed dementia where changes in the brain due to more that one type 
of dementia occur simultaneously (Alzheimer's Society, 2014). Dementia involves 
variable progressive loss of cognitive functioning leading to loss of independence for 
performing activities of daily living and behavioural changes (Chertkow, Feldman, 
Jacova, Massoud, 2013; World Health Organisation (WHO, 2012). Notable early 
symptoms include memory loss and difficulties with problem solving, concentration 
and language (Chertkow et al., 2013; WHO, 2012). The greatest risk factor for 
developing dementia is age with prevalence doubling every 5 to 7 years after the age 
of 65 (Hofman et al., 1991). Other known risk factors include cardiovascular disease, 
high alcohol intake, depression, head injury, lower levels of education and a family 
history of dementia (Solomon et al., 2014). 
The prevalence of dementia among over 65s is 7.1%, while the total number 
of people living with dementia in the UK is estimated at 850,000 for 2015. It is 
predicted that this will rise and that by 2025 there will be 1 million people living 
with dementia in the UK (Alzheimer's Society, 2014). It is estimated that only 46% 
of people in the UK with dementia receive a formal diagnosis or have contact with 
specialist services (Department of Health, 2013). This has led to an initiative to 
increase awareness and early diagnosis of dementia in the UK as part of The 
National Dementia Strategy (Department of Health, 2009) and subsequently The 
Prime Minister’s Dementia Challenge (Department of Health, 2012). The challenge 
focuses on improving research, creating dementia friendly communities and 
continuing improvements in health and care, with commitments to increase diagnosis 
rates through regular health checks. This political drive for earlier diagnosis has 
however come under criticism due to concerns regarding potential harms resulting 
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from over diagnosis and limited evidence supporting benefits of early diagnosis 
(Brunet et al., 2012; Fox et al., 2013; Le Couteur, Doust, Creasey & Brayne, 2013). 
Diagnosis earlier in the development of a dementia has been suggested to 
have a number of benefits (Leifer 2003, Prince, Bryce & Ferri, 2011), including 
relief gained from a better understanding of symptoms, maximising decision-making 
autonomy as well as access to services and the use of available pharmacological, 
psychological and psychosocial interventions. An implicit assumption is that an early 
diagnosis can also be accurate however there is considerable diagnostic uncertainty 
(Beach, Monsell, Phillips & Kukull, 2012; Mitchell, Meader & Pentzek, 2011) with 
cognitive impairment far from synonymous with dementia, it is also associated with 
a range of conditions including stroke (Coco, Lopez & Corrao, 2016), mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI; Petersen, 2004; Petersen et al., 2011) as well as normal ageing 
processes (Salthouse, 2003; Vestergren & Nilsson, 2011). An unintended 
consequence of increased awareness and earlier diagnosis may be that more 
individuals present to services with either subjective memory problems or MCI, 
which are associated with depression and anxiety disorders as well as lower self 
confidence (Iliffe & Pealing, 2010; Regan & Varanelli, 2013). Finally the limited 
effectiveness of available pharmacological interventions (Fox et al., 2013) and 
potential side effects of cholinesterase inhibitors including increased risk of hip 
fractures and syncope (Gill et al., 2009) raises further questions of the benefits of 
diagnosing patients before the usual point of presentation. While there is some 
evidence for cholinesterase inhibitors in mild to moderate dementia, there is no clear 
evidence that they can prevent or delay progression of early dementia symptoms and 
have not been shown to be effective in individuals with MCI (Masoodi, 2013; 
O’Brien et al., 2011).  
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1.2.2 Memory Changes and Subjective Memory Complaints in Normal Ageing 
Normal aging is associated with mild decline in neuropsychological test 
performance that has been shown to be independent of degenerative neurological 
conditions such as dementia (Balota, Dolan & Duchek, 2000; Kliegel & Jager, 2006; 
Salthouse 2009; 2012). Measurable age-related change has been well established in 
tests of processing speed and working memory (Salthouse 2009; 2012), episodic 
memory (Anderson & Craik, 2000; Balota, Dolan & Duchek, 2000) and uncued 
prospective memory (remembering to carry out an intention at some time in the 
future) (Kliegel & Jager, 2006). Cross-sectional studies have suggested age-related 
cognitive decline begins in early adulthood (Salthouse 2009) however longitudinal 
studies have often found maintained levels of performance with more significant 
declines not apparent until age 60 or later (Salthouse 2009; 2010). The differences in 
results found between cross sectional and longitudinal studies could be explained by 
potential cohort differences that may confound cross sectional studies and prior test 
experience that may confound longitudinal studies. A series of studies (Salthouse 
2010; 2013) using a quasi-longitudinal method, where multiple samples of 
participants are tested in different years providing an estimate of change without 
prior test experience, have suggested that the impact of cohort effects may be 
overestimated. Intriguingly there may be differences depending on type of cognition 
with gradual declines in reasoning and processing abilities that may begin as early as 
20 and stability followed by decline at around age 60 for measures of acquired 
knowledge (Salthouse 2013).  
However, significant memory impairment such as that seen in degenerative 
neurological conditions such as dementia, is not an inevitable part of aging (Lobo et 
al., 2000). The majority of cognitively and physically healthy older adults are able to 
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maintain functioning and independence in their everyday activities (Chatterji, Byles, 
Cutler, Seeman, & Verdes, 2015) in spite of the mild age-related changes in memory 
and cognition evidenced by these neuropsychological test findings (Anderson & 
Craik, 2000; Salthouse 2009; 2010). However, many older adults do report 
subjective memory complaints even though objective cognitive assessment may 
show their memory to be within normal limits given their age and education level 
(Gallassi et al., 2008; Ramakers et al., 2009; Weaver Cardin, Collie & Masters, 
2008). Comparing reports of difficulties with memory using a single item and 
episodes of forgetfulness using a structured questionnaire amongst community 
dwelling older adults with and without objective memory impairment, Weaver 
Cardin, Collie and Masters (2008) found no difference in level of complaints 
regarding their memory and cognition. Importantly they found no relationship 
between subjective and objective measures of memory performance irrespective of 
the domain assessed. A potential limitation of this study is that participants were 
initially recruited as part of a six year longitudinal study on healthy aging, meaning 
neither group represents individuals who actively sought help from services, which 
may provide a better indicator of subjective memory problems. However similar 
results were found by Gallassi and colleagues (2008) who investigated subjective 
reports of memory impairment of ninety-two patients without dementia presenting to 
services over a 9 month period and found that nearly half of these individuals had no 
objective memory problem on formal neuropsychological testing. In both of these 
studies cognitive complaints were found to be strongly associated with symptoms of 
depression, even though neither study included individuals with diagnosed 
depression. This may be of particular importance given that anxiety and depression 
are common amongst older people, with the prevalence of anxiety disorders 
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estimated at 3.2% to 14.2% (Wolitzky-Taylor, Castriotta, Lenze, Stanley & Craske, 
2010), while the prevalence of major depression and sub-threshold depressive 
symptoms ranges from 4.6% to 9.3% and 4.5% to 37.3%  respectively (Meeks, 
Vahia, Lavretsky, Kulkarni & Jeste, 2009). A number of large population-based 
studies of community dwelling older people without dementia (Balash, 
Mordechovich, Shabtai, Giladi, Gurevich, & Korczyn, 2013; Benito-León, Mitchell, 
Vega, & Bermejo-Pareja, 2010; Slavin et al. 2010) have since replicated these 
findings, with subjective ratings of memory performance and self-efficacy found to 
be more strongly related to measures of depression and anxiety than 
neuropsychological test performance. Although these findings suggest that memory 
complaints are a stronger indicator of mood difficulties than awareness of memory 
decline, they do not exclude the possibility that there may be subtle changes not 
picked up by tasks used in these studies to assess objective memory performance that 
for more anxious or depressed individuals may affect appraisals of cognitive 
performance and impact beliefs about memory. 
Longitudinal studies have similarly shown that subjective memory 
complaints increase with age although these subjective complaints are still often 
poorly associated with objective memory performance (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 
2011; Frerichs & Tuokko, 2006; Mascherak & Zimprich, 2011). It has been 
suggested that differences in task demands between real life and neuropsychological 
tests may explain the poor correlation between objective memory performance and 
subjective complaints (Craik & Anderson, 1999; Ossher, Flegal & Lustig, 2013). 
The majority of neuropsychological tests are designed to assess the limits of ability 
and therefore do not allow for the use of external aids or strategies (Bouazzaoui et 
al., 2010; Craik & Anderson, 1999), which may have a substantial impact on the 
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occurrence and frequency of memory errors. A meta-analysis of studies investigating 
prospective memory (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips & Crawford, 2004) provides an 
illustrative example of this, the performance of younger adults was shown to be 
superior to older adults in prospective memory tasks carried out in laboratory 
settings, however perhaps unexpectedly older adults outperform younger adults in 
naturalistic settings. This appears to be because older adults were able to make use of 
external aids and strategies to offset their poorer prospective memory ability in the 
naturalistic setting which they were not able to do in the laboratory task. This may 
mean that despite normative age-related changes predicting memory failures and 
lower memory confidence, for some older adults the use of compensatory strategies 
may play an important role in limiting the occurrence and frequency of memory 
errors. 
1.2.3 Mild Cognitive Impairment 
1.2.3.1 Diagnostic criteria  
Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) was first introduced into the clinical 
domain as a diagnostic entity by a group of investigators from the Mayo Clinic in the 
late 1990s (Petersen et al., 1999; Petersen 2004) however there remains controversy 
and lack of consensus over its use as a diagnostic category (Fox et al., 2013; Garrett 
& Valle, 2014; Morris, 2012; Petersen et al., 2014). MCI is characterised by mildly 
impaired performance on objective neuropsychological tests but relatively intact 
global cognition and daily functioning (Albert et al., 2011). MCI is thought to 
represent a transitional state of cognitive impairment that may be a precursor to 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) or other forms of dementia (Feldman & Jacova, 2005; 
Winbald et al., 2004). It can be diagnosed in individuals who experience difficulties 
with memory (amnestic MCI) or with cognitive function (non-amnestic MCI) both 
 10 
subjectively and objectively in relation to age and education norms, but who do not 
meet the diagnostic criteria for dementia and whose difficulties do not significantly 
impact on daily living (Albert et al., 2011; Petersen, 2004; 2011).  
There have been a number of revisions (Petersen, 2004; 2011) to the clinical 
criteria for a diagnosis of MCI with recognition that MCI is more heterogeneous than 
originally thought (Alladi, Arnold, Mitchell, Nestor & Hodges, 2006; Nordlund, 
Rolstad, Hellstrom, Skogren, Hansen & Wallin, 2005; Ward, Arrighi, Michels & 
Cedarbaum, 2012). Despite these attempts to further refine the criteria, the use of 
MCI as a diagnostic label for a potential prodromal stage of dementia remains 
contentious (Beard & Neary, 2013; Garrett & Valle, 2014). There is still debate as to 
how best to operationalise these criteria (Stephan et al., 2013), as well as its 
predictive validity given this heterogeneity and usefulness as a diagnostic label for 
patients (Beard & Neary, 2013; Mattson, Brax & Zetterberg, 2010). MCI can now be 
divided into either single-domain or multiple-domain, depending on the number of 
cognitive domains that are impaired and can be further subdivided into both amnestic 
and non-amnestic variants (Langa & Levine 2014; Petersen, 2011). A classification 
of amnestic MCI (aMCI) is made where memory loss is considered the predominant 
symptom, while non-amnestic MCI (nMCI) refers to presentations where 
impairment is in other aspects of cognitive function not directly related to memory 
that may instead affect attention, language or visuospatial skills (Petersen, 2011). 
The lack of uniformity or a standardised approach to clinical diagnosis is also 
problematic with there being no agreed tests or cut-offs to determine objective 
cognitive decline or what constitutes preserved ability and independence in 
functional activities (Stephan et al., 2013). In practice this has led to a reliance on 
cognitive screening measures or clinical judgement in assessing whether a person 
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meets the criteria for MCI (Moreira, Hughes, Kirkwood, May, Mckeith & Bond, 
2008; Smith & Bondi, 2013). A strong critique of these changes (Morris, 2012) is 
that due to this lack of criteria for what represents “mild problems” in performing 
daily activities, there is no clear categorical distinction between MCI and early stage 
dementia. The lack of sensitivity of screening tests combined with high incidence of 
health or mood difficulties (Palmer et al., 2007; Van der Linde, Stephan, Matthews, 
Brayne, & Savva, 2010) in this population and the subjectivity of clinical judgment 
likely contribute to false positives or false negatives in diagnosis (Smith & Bondi, 
2013). Consequently different clinicians may have a propensity to either over or 
under diagnose, potentially leading to high diagnostic error (Brunet et al., 2012). 
1.2.3.2 Prevalence 
Estimates of prevalence and incidence rates of MCI vary due to poor 
consensus of diagnostic criteria between clinicians as well as different sampling and 
assessment procedures (Ward, Arrighi, Michels & Cedarbaum, 2012). Despite this 
MCI is still common with the prevalence of MCI, depending on the criteria used, 
ranging from 3% to 19% of adults over 65 years old (Gauthier et al., 2006). 
1.2.3.3 Onset, course and prognosis 
Known risk factors for the development of MCI include older age (Manly et 
al., 2008), fewer years of education (Hall et al., 2006; Stern et al., 2006), 
hypertension (Etgen et al., 2010) and depression (Geda et al., 2006). In a longitudinal 
study of cognitively normal individuals, depression more than doubled the risk of 
developing MCI after controlling for age, education and gender (Geda et al., 2006). 
The estimates of outcomes for individuals with MCI show wide variation and 
the predictive value of MCI in identifying who will progress to dementia remains 
largely unrefined. However there is general agreement that the conversion rate from 
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MCI to dementia is higher than that for cognitively unimpaired individuals over 65 
(Feldman & Jacova, 2005). Petersen (2011) proposed that certain subtypes of MCI 
may be more predictive of specific dementia diagnoses. Individuals with aMCI have 
been shown to be more likely to progress to Alzheimer’s disease, at a rate of around 
10-15% per year, compared to older adults with unimpaired cognitive function, who 
convert at a rate of 1-2% per year (Petersen et al., 2001). Further research has 
demonstrated that individuals with aMCI have around a 44% likelihood of 
developing Alzheimer’s disease within one to three years of diagnosis (Schmidtke & 
Hermeneit, 2008). Individuals with subtypes of nMCI have been suggested to be at 
higher risk of progress to other dementias including vascular dementia, dementia 
with Lewy bodies and frontotemporal dementia (Petersen 2011), however at present 
the research evidence to support this is limited and suggests a high degree of 
instability in classification over time (Summers & Saunders, 2012). Post mortem 
studies of individuals identified as having MCI demonstrated no link between MCI 
subtype and brain pathology, with some even showing no pathology (Stephan, 
Matthews, Hunter, Savva, & Bond, 2012). 
Although MCI is widely viewed as a prodromal stage of dementia, it is 
important to note that not all individuals with MCI necessarily progress to dementia 
as would be expected, instead there are many who will remain stable or even recover 
(Anchisi et al., 2005). A meta-analysis of cohort studies indicated that although this 
population is at increased risk, with around 5-10% converting to dementia in the first 
year, most people with MCI do not progress to dementia, even after 10 years, with 
some individuals showing improvement in cognitive functioning (Mitchell & Shiri-
Feshki, 2009). In one study, as many as 19.5% of individuals diagnosed with MCI 
had improved to a level of normal cognitive function within three years of diagnosis 
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while a further 61% continued to meet criteria for MCI (Wolf et al., 1998). Taken 
together these findings suggest that MCI diagnosis may be a risk factor for dementia 
however further cognitive decline is far from inevitable, which raises questions about 
how patients make sense of this uncertain label and the potential psychosocial 
consequences of diagnosis for the individual (Beard & Neary, 2013). 
1.2.3.4 Comorbidity  
Patients with MCI commonly experience co-morbid anxiety and depression 
symptoms with rates reported as high as 45% and 61% respectively (Palmer et al., 
2007; Van der Linde, Stephan, Matthews, Brayne, & Savva, 2010). Symptoms of 
both depression and anxiety have been shown to increase as memory performance 
decreases (McDougall, Becker, & Arheart, 2006). A systematic review found that 
individuals with MCI were more likely to experience neuropsychiatric symptoms 
compared to cognitively healthy controls, with 35-75% of individuals with MCI 
experiencing symptoms of depression, apathy, anxiety, irritability or sleep 
disturbance (Apostolova & Cummings, 2007). Individuals with MCI have also been 
shown to rate their quality of life lower than cognitively healthy controls 
(Muangpaisan et al., 2008). 
1.3 Individual Consequences of Memory Concerns 
1.3.1 Memory Self Efficacy and Stereotype Threat in Normal Ageing 
A number of studies have demonstrated that even in the absence of objective 
memory difficulties, older people have more negative beliefs about their memory 
ability than younger adults (Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998; Ryan & See, 1993). A 
longitudinal study found that over a six year period these negative beliefs about 
memory ability in older people worsened over time (McDonald-Miszczak, Hertzog 
& Hultsch, 1995). It has also been established that older adults consistently report 
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lower levels of memory self-efficacy or confidence in their memory ability than 
younger individuals and that this lack of confidence appears to be independent of 
actual memory changes (Wells & Esopenko, 2008). These beliefs also appear to be 
more vulnerable to influence from perceived poor performance and are more likely 
to associate memory failure with aging rather than attributing this to contextual or 
temporary causes (Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998). Following exposure to a series of 
cognitively demanding memory tasks self-ratings of memory-specific competence 
decreased in older adults, however these showed little change or even improvement 
in younger adults (Bielak et al., 2007).  
Older adults’ ratings of self-efficacy appear to vary considerably depending 
on the task and are heavily influenced by negative stereotypes about aging 
(Desrichard & Köpetz, 2005; Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998). Interestingly, these 
stereotypes may also have an impact on older adults’ performance on memory tests; 
this has been investigated in experimental manipulations of stereotype threat. 
Younger and older adults were asked to complete a memory task that either 
emphasised or de-emphasised memory, placing older adults in a testing situation in 
which widely held negative age-related stereotypes were triggered undermined 
subsequent memory performance (Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam & 
Hasher, 2005). Poor memory self efficacy has also been shown to predict attendance 
at memory clinics in older adults with subjective memory complaints (Ramakers et 
al., 2009), these individuals reported greater decline in memory functioning, reduced 
memory capacity and were more likely to report a family history of dementia than 
controls. 
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1.3.2 Individual Consequences of MCI Diagnosis 
Receiving a diagnosis of MCI has been associated with lower self 
confidence, anxiety and uncertainty over diagnosis (Frank et al., 2006; Joosten-
Weyn Banningh, Vernooij-Dassen, Rikkert & Teunisse, 2008; Regan & Varanelli, 
2013). The heterogeneous nature of MCI and the absence of an effective treatment 
has the potential to be overwhelming and anxiety-provoking for patients and their 
families (Whitehouse, 2007). As discussed previously, individuals with MCI 
experience high rates of co-morbid anxiety and depression, which have been shown 
to increase as cognitive functioning decreases (McDougall, Becker, & Arheart, 
2006). Individuals with MCI report frustration and embarrassment about their 
memory and cognitive changes as well as feeling uncertain about their diagnosis 
(Frank et al., 2006). A number of researchers have suggested that the diagnostic label 
may itself potentially worsen psychological distress in individuals with MCI 
(Werner & Korczyn, 2008). The MCI diagnosis is poorly understood by patients, 
who often have differing attributions for their difficulties, including dementia, 
normal ageing or even personality traits and habits (Joosten-Weyn Banningh et al., 
2008). The authors noted that many of these attributions appeared likely to further 
contribute to the development of anxiety or depression, which is more prevalent in 
individuals with MCI than cognitively unimpaired older adults. This may be 
particularly important for this population, where psychological distress is associated 
with greater likelihood of progression of cognitive impairment (Simard, Hudon, & 
van Reekum, 2009). While dementia may have underlying neurodegenerative causes, 
the experience of psychological distress and its sequelae during early cognitive 
impairment may lead to increased disability, reduced independence and accelerated 
progression to diagnostic criteria for dementia (Tran, Srivareerat, & Alkadhi, 2010). 
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1.4 Compensatory Strategies 
1.4.1 Use of Compensatory Strategies for Subjective Memory Concerns 
Despite poorer performance on memory tests and lower memory self efficacy 
ratings, community dwelling older people rarely feel that these changes interfere 
with their ability to carry out their usual activities of daily living (Hess & Pullen, 
1996). It has been suggested that the type and frequency of memory errors that older 
adults actually experience in everyday life may be influenced by the use of external 
supports such as memory aids (Bouazzaoui, Isingrini, Fay, et al., 2010; Lovelace & 
Twohig, 1990). Compensatory strategies, including both external aids and internal 
strategies, have been shown to be effective in a variety of memory-impaired and 
non-memory impaired populations. External aids such as calendars, timers, and 
dosette boxes have been shown to be the most effective means of ensuring 
competition of everyday prospective memory tasks such as remembering 
appointments and to take medications on time (West, 1995). Older people perform 
consistently worse than younger adults in laboratory based experiments that do not 
allow for use of external supports, however often perform better than younger adults 
in prospective memory tasks in daily life where they can make use of memory aids 
(Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004).  
Diminished confidence in memory ability also appears to influence the 
selection of internal compensatory strategies for older people. For example older 
people with low memory confidence were found to be more likely to actively avoid 
cognitively demanding situations and put less effort into tasks assessing memory 
performance (Wells & Esopenko, 2008). While a study looking at memory reliance 
during a word pair association task showed that older participants were more 
reluctant to rely on their memories than younger participants, despite there being no 
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differences in performance, and instead were likely to engage in checking suggesting 
doubt about memory competence (Touron & Hertzog, 2004).  
1.4.2 Use of Compensatory Strategies in MCI 
As previously stated present treatment options for MCI are limited, current 
guidance encourages the use of repetition of information, the use of memory aids and 
increased familiarity (Alzheimer's Society, 2012). A qualitative study examining 
changes in daily life associated with MCI, suggested individuals with MCI 
developed effective external strategies to compensate for deficits (e.g. calendars and 
reminders) as well as altering their roles and responsibilities in daily activities and 
relationships (Blieszner, Roberto, Wilcox, Barham, & Winston, 2007). A study 
investigating the coping styles used by individuals with MCI to manage anxiety 
around progression of their difficulties, found that people tended to use problem-
focused coping (e.g. using external and internal memory strategies to prevent 
forgetting) and avoidance-orientated coping (e.g. preventing their mistakes by 
avoiding difficult situations, hiding their difficulties from others and denying of 
forgetfulness) (Joosten-Weyn Banningh et al., 2008). Although it is known that 
individuals with amnestic MCI exhibit lower memory confidence, limited 
information is available about their use of internal compensatory strategies, however 
research with student populations has shown that manipulations of memory 
confidence can lead to a greater desire to engage in checking behaviours (Alcolado 
& Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, Radomsky & Taylor, 2013). 
Individuals with MCI have been shown to experience difficulties with 
prospective memory or remembering to perform intended actions in the future (Costa 
et al, 2010; Thompson, Henry, Rendell, Withall & Brodaty, 2010), moderate 
declines have also shown to be common among older people without MCI (Woods, 
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Weinborn, Velnoweth, Rooney, & Bucks, 2012). Examples of tasks which rely on 
prospective memory include remembering to take medication at the prescribed time, 
keep an appointment and turn off the stove (Woods, Weinborn, Velnoweth, Rooney, 
& Bucks, 2012; Zogg, Woods, Sauceda, Wiebe, & Simoni, 2012). Research with non 
clinical populations has shown that participants who received false negative 
feedback about their prospective memory performance report significantly higher 
levels of doubt and urges to check compared to those who received false positive 
feedback (Cuttler et al., 2013). These findings suggest that negative beliefs and 
diminished confidence in prospective memory can cause increased doubt and urges 
to engage in checking behaviour. It may be that those with a particular fear of 
developing a dementia will be more likely to hold negative beliefs and have 
diminished confidence in their prospective memory, making this group potentially 
more likely to engage in checking behaviours. 
1.5 Interim Summary 
Concerns regarding memory performance are common in older adults and 
more people are presenting earlier to services with either subjective memory 
problems or mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Although MCI is widely seen as a 
prodromal stage of dementia, many people do not progress to dementia even after 10 
years (Mitchell & Shiri-Feshki, 2009). There has been considerable debate over the 
utility of the MCI diagnosis with questions over its predictive value and poor 
consensus between clinicians. Lower memory confidence may lead individuals to 
use compensatory strategies, including avoidance and checking, in an attempt to 
prevent episodes of forgetting, some of which may be ineffective or even unhelpful. 
Given that one of the defining differences between MCI and dementia is impairment 
in everyday functioning, avoidance of cognitively demanding situations has the 
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potential to lead to inappropriate or accelerated progression to diagnosis of a 
dementia. Similarly there is a growing body of literature showing that repeated 
checking paradoxically leads to decreased confidence in memory, in a number of 
studies attempting to test Rachman’s (2002) cognitive theory of compulsive 
checking (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 2006; 
Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010; Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie, 2014). 
1.6 Repeated Checking and Memory 
1.6.1 Repeated Checking 
Repeated checking consists of repeated verification that an act thought to 
prevent harm was performed or that a harmful act was not (e.g. that the door was 
locked or the oven was turned off). Much of the research into repeated checking has 
centred on its role as one of the most prevalent compulsions in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD), with 81% of those diagnosed reporting checking compulsions 
(Antony, Downue & Swinson, 1998). However a further 15% of the general 
population have also been shown to demonstrate sub-clinical checking compulsions 
(Stein et al., 1997). Research in this area has sought to explain firstly why 
individuals engage in checking behaviours and secondly why this checking is then 
repeated, often numerous times with diminishing returns to the individual in terms of 
a positive outcome.  
Cognitive behavioural models of compulsive checking have highlighted the 
role of high perceived probability of serious harm and high perceived levels of 
personal responsibility in individuals engaging in checking behaviours (Rachman, 
2002; Salkovskis 1985). Numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals with 
OCD have elevated perceptions of personal responsibility, make biased assessments 
of the probability and seriousness of possible harm and that manipulation of these 
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increases the likelihood of engaging in checking behaviours (Lopatka & Rachman, 
1995; Rachman, 1993). It has been proposed that memory may also play an 
important role, given that individuals who engage in checking often experience high 
levels of doubt in the accuracy of their memories (Exner, Martin, & Rief, 2009) 
1.6.2 The Role of Memory in Repeated Checking 
It had been proposed that the memory distrust seen in individuals who 
engage in compulsive checking and particularly those with OCD, may be due to an 
objective memory impairment which they try to compensate for with excessive 
checking (Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews & Alexander, 1989). Despite its intuitive 
appeal, no definitive evidence to support this hypothesis has been found, with 
reviews of the research in this area highlighting inconsistent findings for memory 
performance in OCD (Muller & Roberts, 2005) and in anxiety disorders in general 
(Coles & Heimberg, 2002) where repeated checking is prevalent. A larger study of 
neuropsychological deficits in OCD, including people with OCD, OCD plus a co-
morbid disorder and participants with a history of OCD, also found no reliable 
deficits to be associated with a diagnosis of OCD on tests of memory (Simpson et 
al., 2006). 
In addition to a more general memory deficit, it has also been hypothesised 
that individuals with OCD may have specific memory deficits for threat-related 
stimuli or activities. However studies investigating this hypothesis utilising more 
ecologically valid stimuli have suggested this is not the case. Tolin et al. (2001) 
found no evidence for memory deficits in individuals with OCD using stimuli related 
to their specific concerns, when compared to both anxious and non-anxious controls. 
While Radomsky, Rachman, and Hammond (2001) found that in conditions of both 
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high and low responsibility, individuals with OCD and checking compulsions 
actually showed improved memory accuracy for threat-related information. 
1.6.3 The Role of Metamemory in Repeated Checking  
Metamemory is defined as knowledge and awareness of one’s own memory 
capabilities. This includes factors that relate to or describe memory such as memory 
confidence, vividness (e.g. clarity and intensity of memory) and detail (e.g. memory 
of particular visual features. Given the lack of consistent evidence for objective 
memory impairment in individuals who engage in checking, it has been proposed 
that the high levels of doubt reported may be due to a metamemory problem. 
Specifically, low confidence in memory, and that it is this rather than the accuracy of 
memory that plays a role in the development of checking. This lack of confidence in 
memory that characterises OCD, has been reliably demonstrated in a number of 
studies in the absence of deficits in memory accuracy (Cougle, Salkovskis, & Wahl, 
2007; Macdonald et al., 1997; Tolin et al., 2001). Research with non-clinical 
populations has provided further support for this theory, where participants who 
received false negative feedback about their memory reported significantly higher 
levels of doubt and urges to check compared to those who received false positive 
feedback (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, 
Radomsky & Taylor, 2013). However while this explains how checking may begin, 
it does not explain why in many cases doubt persists for individuals even after 
checking. 
1.6.4 Rachman’s (2002) Cognitive Theory of Compulsive Checking  
A growing body of literature (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; Radomsky, 
Gilchrist & Dussault, 2006) demonstrates repeated checking may paradoxically both 
be a consequence of and lead to further memory distrust, in a number of studies 
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attempting to test Rachman’s (2002) cognitive theory of compulsive checking. 
Rachman’s (2002) theory has sought to explain the processes by which checking 
behaviours in OCD are maintained. It proposes three cognitive ‘multipliers’ 
including increased responsibility, probability of harm and anticipated seriousness of 
harm which interact to initiate the checking behaviour. The checking behaviour is 
then maintained by a self-perpetuating mechanism, where doubt increases checking 
and checking increases doubt. Catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of 
‘not remembering’ despite checking then contribute to further escalation in checking 
behaviour.  
Van den Hout and Kindt (2003b) hypothesised that reductions in memory 
confidence may be due to other aspects of metamemory, specifically vividness and 
detail, being affected by increased familiarity following repeated checking. 
Confidence in our memory for specific events has been found to be influenced by the 
vividness and detail of these memories (Van den Hout and Kindt, 2003b), whilst 
increased familiarity has paradoxically been shown to lead to less detailed and vivid 
recollections (Johnston & Hawley, 1994). It has been suggested that this inhibition 
of perceptual processing is due to processing priority being increasingly given to 
higher-level semantics rather than lower-level perceptual elements (such as colours 
or shapes). Therefore while an individual with OCD may be motivated to check by 
the desire to reduce uncertainty, the more they check the less detailed and vivid their 
recollection which negatively impacts on confidence in memory for previous checks. 
This likely precipitates further checking in a counterproductive attempt to regain 
memory vividness, detail and confidence, giving rise to the self-perpetuating 
mechanism described by Rachman (2002).  
1.7 Experimental Studies Investigating Repeated Checking 
 23 
1.7.1 Methodological Approaches to Investigating Checking Behaviour 
Checking behaviour can take many forms, including ‘visual checking’, 
‘mental checking’, ‘physical checking’ and reassurance seeking (Radomsky & 
Alcolado, 2010).  Though all forms of checking are common, research has focused 
on investigating the effects of repeated ‘physical checking’. ‘Physical checking’ 
involves manipulating an object to make sure a particular action has been carried out 
(Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). The majority of research studies investigating 
repeated checking utilise a ‘stove paradigm’ originally developed by Van den Hout 
and Kindt (2003a; 2003b; 2004) and later adapted by Radomsky, Gilchrist and 
Dussault (2006).  
1.7.2 Empirical Evidence in Non-clinical Samples  
The stove paradigm utilised by Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a; 2003b; 
2004) in their original series of five experiments, consisted of participants being 
trained to ‘turn-on’, ‘turn-off’ and ‘check’ the six knobs of a virtual gas stove, as 
well as perform a similar sequence with virtual light bulbs. Following this training 
phase, participants completed a pre-checking trial, where they were asked to ‘turn-
on’, ‘turn-off’ and ‘check’ a set of three knobs on the stove. Participants were then 
either asked to perform 20 further checking trials using the virtual stove, in the 
‘relevant checking’ condition, or of the virtual light bulbs, in the ‘irrelevant 
checking’ condition, before completing one further post-checking trial of the stove. 
These experiments showed that non-clinical participants who engaged in repeated 
‘relevant checking’ of the virtual gas stove, as opposed to ‘irrelevant checking’ of 
virtual light bulbs, had significantly decreased memory confidence, vividness and 
detail for a subsequent check of the virtual stove. Memory accuracy and confidence 
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in outcome for this final check was unaffected by the repeated ‘relevant checking’ 
trials. 
Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault (2006) attempted to replicate and extend 
this finding in a laboratory based experiment using a working electric stove and sink 
in place of the virtual stove and lights. They hypothesised that the use of virtual 
stimuli presented only a limited sense of perceived threat or responsibility for the 
prevention of harm and therefore reduced the affect that would be generated in more 
ecologically valid situations. Consistent with the findings of van den Hout & Kindt 
(2003a; 2003b; 2004), reduced memory confidence, vividness and detail were 
observed following ‘relevant checking’ in the post-checking trial. Unlike the van den 
Hout and Kindt (2003a; 2003b; 2004) experiments, there was also a slight but 
significant decrease in memory accuracy following the post-checking trial in the 
‘relevant checking’ condition. However as there was no manipulation check of threat 
or responsibility it is unclear if this inconsistency in memory accuracy between the 
studies is due to the improved ecological validity of the paradigm resulting in higher 
perceived responsibility or increased probability and severity of harm as had been 
proposed by Radomsky et al. (2006). Additionally the stove task in this study utilised 
a single removable plastic knob to operate all six hobs while the burner lights were 
covered (Radomsky et al., 2006). These alterations were made to the stove paradigm 
to prevent participants from engaging in visual checking to determine the status of 
the stove between trials, however may have also have artificially increased the 
difficulty of this task which may explain the observed differences in memory 
accuracy. 
Despite consistent findings of reductions in metamemory, the ecological 
validity and extent to which either paradigm truly represents the difficulties faced by 
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individuals who engage in repeated checking is questionable. Due to the 
methodological challenges of testing the effects of repeated checking, this paradigm 
utilises a complex procedure with multiple checks being given over a short period of 
time to provide an approximation of an individual’s experience of repeated checking. 
The stove paradigm requires participants to remember which 3 of the 6 stoves they 
checked on the post-test trial following multiple trials with different outcomes, rather 
than simply if the stove is off or if they checked the stove. Additionally although 
both van den Hout & Kindt (2004) and Radomsky et al. (2006) include a ‘check’ 
step, this is limited in its scope, meaning it is unclear whether these effects are due 
specifically to ‘checking’ or ‘repetition’. Nevertheless these studies provide support 
to the hypothesis that doubt is a normal phenomenon following repeated checking, 
providing an insight into why compulsive checkers continue to distrust their memory 
despite repeated checking. 
While the effects on memory accuracy remain unclear, reductions in memory 
confidence, vividness and detail following repeated checking are well established 
and have been replicated in studies utilising both virtual (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 
2007; Dek et al., 2010; Medway & Jones, 2013) and functional stimuli (Coles, 
Radomsky & Horng, 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010; Radomsky et al., 2014). A 
number of studies have begun to test the limits of the repeated checking effect. 
Coles, Radomsky and Horng (2006) using a functional stove showed that varying the 
number of checking trials resulted in significant reductions in metamemory 
occurring after as few as 5-10 relevant checks. Additional trend analyses for this 
study revealed that such effects were detectable even after only two checks. At 
present no studies have reviewed the impact of increased checking trials on memory 
accuracy above the 20 trials used in the original paradigm. However a recent study 
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has suggested that physically ‘checking’ itself may not be necessary for these effects 
to occur and simply repeatedly using an object can have the same effects on 
metamemory. Medway & Jones (2013) adapted the virtual stove paradigm to 
compare repeated checking with repeated stimuli use, where the ‘check’ step was 
removed, and found significant reductions in memory confidence, vividness and 
detail as well as slight reductions in memory accuracy. This provides support for the 
hypothesis that reductions in metamemory may be the result of increased familiarity 
rather than something unique to checking and suggests that alongside other factors 
proposed by Rachman (2002) that repeated object use may serve as a precursor to 
repeated checking. 
Van den Hout & Kindt (2003a; 2003b; 2004) proposed that reductions in 
metamemory as a result of repeated checking may be explained by coding shifting 
from perceptual processing to more semantic processing. This was explored in their 
series of experiments utilising the virtual stove paradigm, where participants who 
were in the relevant checking condition were more likely to report only ‘knowing’ 
which knobs they had checked rather than being able to ‘remember’ in comparison 
to participants in the irrelevant checking condition. This finding has since been 
replicated (Coles, Radomsky & Horng, 2006; Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 
2006) providing further support for this hypothesis. Boschen, Wilson & Farrell 
(2011) attempted to build on this finding utilising a computerised virtual stove task 
where the stimulus would change colour every 5 checks, the aim of this was to test if 
memory distrust can be ameliorated through the use of novel stimuli. In line with this 
hypothesis, participants in the relevant checking condition did not experience the 
decrease in memory confidence, vividness and detail seen in other studies. The 
results of this study suggest the potential for interventions aimed at increasing the 
 27 
novelty of checks may limit the effects of repeated checking or object use. However 
a factor that may limit their generalisability is that while distinctiveness and novelty 
can be easily achieved within a computerised task they may be more challenging to 
replicate in real life settings. 
1.7.3 Empirical Evidence in Clinical Samples 
Only two studies have investigated the impact of repeated checking on 
memory accuracy within clinical populations, both of which included participants 
with OCD (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Radomsky et al., 2014). Boschen & 
Vuksanovic (2007) compared individuals with OCD to undergraduate controls using 
the virtual stove paradigm under both high and low responsibility conditions. 
Following repeated checking individuals with OCD and controls showed similar 
metamemory declines and a small decrease in memory accuracy, however in the 
high responsibility condition where participants were told that another person would 
receive a mild shock each time a mistake was made, individuals with OCD showed 
further decline in memory confidence. Radomsky et al. (2014) compared individuals 
with OCD who reported primarily checking symptoms to undergraduate controls, 
replicating the functional stove paradigm (Radomsky et al., 2006). They found 
similar reductions in metamemory ratings following relevant repeated checking in 
both groups, in addition to small but significant declines in memory accuracy. No 
differences in memory accuracy were found between clinical and student 
participants.  
These studies support Rachman’s (2002) model of checking and the self-
perpetuating cycle by demonstrating that participants with OCD and controls who 
engage in repeated checking experience similar metamemory declines. However 
there are a number of limitations to these studies that need to be considered when 
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interpreting these findings. Although Radomsky et al. (2014) specifically tested 
individuals with OCD primarily with checking compulsions, which is important as 
they may be affected differently by the process of repeated checking than individuals 
who engage in other compulsions, neither study used stimuli relevant to the specific 
concerns of the individuals with OCD. This is a potential limitation of these studies 
as the use of stimuli relevant to participants specific concerns may have lead to an 
increase in threat and responsibility. Ideographically selected compulsive actions 
have been shown to lead to significantly more cognitive doubt compared to neutral 
actions when performed by those with OCD (Hermans et al., 2008). A further 
methodological weakness of these studies is the selection of undergraduate controls 
as they do not necessarily approximate to clinical populations. A more appropriate 
sample could be drawn from a population of anxious controls or sub clinical 
checkers in order to isolate whether the effect is specific to OCD checkers.  
At present no research has been conducted involving other clinical 
populations where reduced confidence in memory may be particularly salient, such 
as in cognitive impairment. Alcolado & Radomsky (2011) demonstrated that 
individuals with manipulated low memory confidence are more likely to have the 
urge to check. This would suggest this mechanism is bi-directional and there may be 
other clinical populations who may engage in checking behaviours, which may 
include individuals with either objective or subjective memory difficulties. This 
could also have important clinical implications for the use of memory aids with 
clinical populations and the circumstances under which these may reduce or improve 
confidence in memory. 
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1.8 Rationale for the Preset Study 
Concerns regarding memory performance, notably prospective memory and 
the potential onset of dementia become increasing common in older people (Jorm et 
al., 1994). Older people both with and without objective memory difficulties may 
engage in compensatory strategies to reduce feelings of uncertainty, including 
checking behaviours or a reliance on memory aids. However, the use of these 
compensatory strategies may paradoxically lead to reductions in memory confidence, 
vividness and detail as well as potential reductions in memory accuracy. This is 
likely to precipitate further checking in a counterproductive attempt to regain 
memory clarity and confidence, giving rise to a self-perpetuating mechanism, similar 
to that described by Rachman (2002). For some individuals reductions in memory 
confidence and catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of ‘not 
remembering’ despite checking may be seen as a signs of further memory decline, 
possibly resulting in increased anxiety and the avoidance of activities. This may be 
of particular significance in MCI where a criterion which separates MCI diagnosis 
from dementia is that the difficulties do not significantly impact on daily living 
(Petersen, 2004). This potentially could lead to inappropriate diagnosis for these 
individuals (false positives) and the unnecessary use of medication, which can have 
serious side-effects (Winblad et al., 2008). 
The present study therefore aimed to build upon previous research by 
adapting the paradigm used by Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault (2006) to investigate 
the effects of repeated ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ checking on memory accuracy and 
metamemory (memory confidence, vividness and detail) in community dwelling 
older people without memory problems and to pilot an investigation of this effect in 
a sample of individuals with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Participants in the 
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‘relevant checking’ condition checked a non-functional replica stove while those in 
the ‘irrelevant checking’ condition checked a dosette box, before completing a final 
checking trial of the stove. The study also looked to test if a similar shift from 
“remembering” to “knowing” is reported by those engaged in repeated ‘relevant 
checking’, as reported by van den Hout & Kindt (2003a). Finally the study 
investigated the potential relationship between fear of developing a dementia and 
self reports of prospective memory, which may be particularly relevant given that 
diminished confidence in prospective memory can cause increased doubt and urges 
to engage in checking behaviour. Measures of anxiety and depression were included 
in the analyses as covariates, as both have been shown to impact on memory 
(Kizilbash, Vanderploeg & Curtis, 2002).  
The study may have theoretical implications for Rachman’s model of 
compulsive checking (2002) and the extent to which memory accuracy declines seen 
by Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault (2006) were due higher perceived threat 
resulting from improved ecological validity or the increased difficulty of their task. 
Despite the use of a non-functioning stove it is hypothesised that in this experiment 
the sense of threat to these participants comes as much from failing to remember as 
something catastrophic happening as a result of not remembering. The results of the 
study may also have important clinical implications for formulation and treatment 
development for individuals with memory concerns. Possible treatment applications 
of the findings could include psychoeducation and behavioural experiments to 
demonstrate the benefits or problems of engaging in checking for individuals with 
memory concerns and how best to implement memory aids such as diaries and 
dosette boxes.  
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1.9 Research Questions 
1. Does repeated relevant checking lead to significantly reduced memory confidence, 
vividness and detail for recall in older people and people with MCI, when compared 
to an irrelevant checking condition? 
2. Does repeated relevant checking lead to significant reductions in memory 
accuracy in older people and people with MCI, when compared to an irrelevant 
checking condition? 
3. Does repeated relevant checking result in older people and people with MCI 
having a general sense of “knowing” that a check has been completed rather than a 
specific memory of completing the check? 
4. Do older people and individuals with MCI with a greater apprehension about 
developing Alzheimer’s disease report a higher incidence of prospective memory 
slips in everyday life? 
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2.0 Methodology 
2.1 Design 
This study employed 2 x 2 mixed factorial experimental designs to test the 
above hypotheses for the older adult and MCI samples. The independent variable 
was checking type (relevant checking and irrelevant checking). Participants were 
randomly assigned to either a relevant checking or an irrelevant checking condition 
using permuted block randomisation and sealed envelopes. The dependent variables 
were measures of memory accuracy and metamemory (confidence, vividness and 
detail) assessed at two time points (pre-checking and post-checking). 
2.2 Participants 
2.2.1 Older Adult Sample 
A sample of community dwelling older people without cognitive impairment 
were recruited from a nonclinical population. 60 years of age was chosen as the 
lower age range, in line with the United Nations definition of an older person 
(United Nations, 2013). 
2.2.1.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
To be included in the study participants had to be aged older than 60 years 
and living independently in the community, fluent in English and judged capable by 
the researcher of giving informed consent. Participants were excluded if there was 
evidence or a diagnosis of cognitive impairment (including MCI and dementia). 
They were also excluded if they had a learning disability, physical or sensory 
disability that would significantly impact on their participation. Individuals receiving 
treatment for alcohol related problems or for OCD were also excluded from the 
study. 
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2.2.1.2 Sample size 
According to a power calculation using G Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007), for a 2 X 2 MANOVA, it was estimated that, with power set at .8 
and α at .05, a total of 25 participants would be required to detect an effect size of 
.32 (see Appendix A). A further power calculation was conducted for the second of 
the primary hypotheses, for a 2 X 2 ANOVA, it was estimated that, with power set at 
.8 and α at .05, a total of 28 participants would be required to detect an effect size of 
.56 (see Appendix B). Both calculations were based on effect sizes reported within 
the repeated checking literature (Radomsky et al., 2014). 
2.2.1.3 Recruitment process 
The sample of community dwelling older people without cognitive 
impairment were recruited through memory clinics in Norfolk and Suffolk NHS 
Foundation Trust (NSFT) and North East London NHS Foundation Trust (NELFT) 
as well as voluntary sector services in Norfolk and Suffolk. Potential participants 
who met the inclusion and exclusion criteria were informed of the study by 
clinicians/workers within these teams. If they were agreeable to being contacted 
regarding the study, they were asked if their name and contact details could be 
shared with the researcher to discuss the study in greater detail and be invited to take 
part. 
2.2.2 MCI Sample 
A community dwelling sample of individuals with MCI was recruited 
through memory clinics. Due to poor consensus of diagnostic criteria between 
clinicians as well as the use of different assessment procedures (Ward et al., 2012), 
participants were judged by the referring clinician to score 0.5 on the Clinical 
Dementia Rating Scale (CDR, Morris, 1993) and meet the Petersen (2004) criteria 
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for MCI. The diagnostic criteria defined by Peterson (2004) criteria are often used in 
clinical practice and research (Stephan et al., 2013). They define MCI as 
subjective/objective memory complaint, normal general cognitive function and an 
objective memory impairment, which is not better explained by functional 
impairment and does not meet the diagnostic criteria for dementia. A systematic 
review of research with this population suggested that 50 years old would be an 
appropriate lower age limit for inclusion in the study (Stephan et al., 2013). 
2.2.1.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 To be included in the study participants had to have a current diagnosis of 
mild cognitive impairment (MCI) given within the last 6 months. In addition to 
being judged by the referring clinician to score 0.5 on the Clinical Dementia Rating 
Scale (CDR, Morris, 1993) and meet the Petersen (2004) criteria for MCI. To take 
part individuals had to be older than 50 and living in the community, as well as being 
fluent in English and judged capable of giving informed consent. Participants were 
excluded if their primary concern was anxiety (including OCD) or depression rather 
than cognitive impairment. Participants were also excluded if they had a learning 
disability, physical or sensory disability that would significantly impact on 
participation. Individuals receiving treatment for alcohol related problems or if this 
was recorded as a co-morbid issue were also excluded. 
2.2.1.2 Sample size 
Due to the challenges with recruitment of individuals with MCI, notably in 
identifying potential participants in services who reliably meet the Peterson (2004) 
criteria (Ward et al., 2012), as well as due to difficulties with co-morbid anxiety 
within this population (Palmer et al., 2007; Van der Linde, et al., 2010), the study 
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will attempt to pilot an investigation of this effect in a smaller sample of 14 
individuals with MCI. 
2.2.1.3 Recruitment process 
The sample of individuals with MCI was recruited through memory clinics in 
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT) and North East London NHS 
Foundation Trust (NELFT). Potential participants who met the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were informed of the study by clinicians within these teams, who 
were asked to consider the individual’s capacity to consent to taking part in the 
study. If participants were agreeable to being contacted regarding the study, they 
were asked if their name and contact details could be shared with the researcher to 
discuss the study in greater detail and be invited to take part. 
2.3 Experimental Task 
 The experimental task used in this study was adapted from an experimental 
protocol used in a number of laboratory based experiments utilising a real stove and 
tap to investigate the effects of repeated checking on memory accuracy and 
metamemory (Radomsky et al., 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2011; Radomsky et 
al., 2014). The primary author of this experimental paradigm (Professor Adam 
Radomsky) generously provided full details of his experimental paradigm. The 
present study instead utilised a model stove and dosette box which served two 
functions. The first of these was to allow for the study materials to be easily 
transported to participants’ homes. This was important as members of the target 
population were likely to have found transport to a single laboratory setting difficult. 
Secondly, given these tasks were originally designed to examine repeated checking 
as seen within OCD, this allowed for the use of tasks that were considered more 
ecologically valid and representative of checking within the target population.  
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2.3.1 Stove Task 
Participants were trained to “turn-on”, then “turn-off’” and finally to “check” 
a set of knobs on a non-functional replica stove top in a ritualised manner. To create 
an analogue procedure ‘out of the lab’ consistent with the Radomsky protocols, a 
full-scale plastic ‘stovetop’ was created for this study. The replica stovetop had six 
identical plastic stove knobs which could be rotated from zero to five. Each knob on 
the stove corresponded to one of six stove burners. During the experiment the stove 
knobs were referred to by numbers one to six. To ensure that participants understood 
which number corresponded to which knob a numbered diagram was provided to the 
participant (see Appendix C).  
Instructions were given during each relevant checking trial to perform this 
series of actions on a set of three stove knobs (see Appendix D). In previous studies 
which utilised a real stove (Radomsky et al., 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2011; 
Radomsky et al., 2014), the knobs were removed and replaced with a single knob to 
ensure that there were no visual cues that could inform the participants that the stove 
had been correctly turned off. It was decided that for this task the knobs would not 
be removed as this would artificially increase the difficulty of the task and reduce its 
ecological validity. 
2.3.2 Dosette Box Task 
All participants were trained to “open and remove the capsule”, then “close” 
and finally to “check” the compartments of a ‘dosette’ box or pill organiser. A 
dosette box was chosen as a comparator here because it was considered to have a 
high level of face-validity with participants. The dosette box had 28 individual 
compartments arranged in a seven by four configuration. The days of the week 
(Sunday to Saturday) were labelled along the top and each compartment was labelled 
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either morning, noon, evening or bed.  Each compartment contained an empty 
coloured gelatine capsule. The individual compartments were opaque and therefore 
required the lid of that individual compartment to be opened to complete the check. 
A container was provided in which to place the gelatine capsules once removed from 
the dosette box. Instructions were given during each irrelevant checking trial to 
perform this series of actions on a single compartment of the dosette box (see 
Appendix E). It was decided that the increased number of potential locations in the 
dosette box task would allow it to be suitably complex to perform the same function 
as the irrelevant checking tasks involving a sink or light used in previous studies. 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Clinical Dementia Rating Scale (CDR; Morris, 1993) 
The CDR (Morris, 1993) was used to provide a rating of cognitive and 
functional performance and was completed by the referring clinician as part of the 
establishment of MCI status. The CDR is a global dementia rating scale that rates 
impairment in each of six domains: Memory, Orientation, Judgment and Problem 
Solving, Community Affairs, Home and Hobbies, and Personal Care. The CDR 
provides a global score that is a composite score based on an algorithm giving 
different weights to the scores for each of the domains. This global score is used to 
grade the severity of impairment and is measured using 0, 0.5, 1, 2, and 3 to denote 
no impairment, mild cognitive impairment or questionable dementia, mild dementia, 
moderate dementia, and severe dementia. It can be completed in around 3 minutes 
for clinicians already familiar with individual cases (see Appendix F). The CDR 
demonstrates good overall inter-rater reliability (kappa = .62). 
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2.4.2 Geriatric Anxiety Inventory Short Form (GAI-SF; Byrne & Pachana, 
2011) 
The GAI-SF (Byrne & Pachana, 2011) is used to detect the presence of 
anxiety. The GAI-SF is a five item self report questionnaire which can be completed 
in between 1 and 2 minutes (see Appendix G). A score of three or greater is 
considered optimal for the detecting DSM-IV Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). 
The GAI-SF has demonstrated a sensitivity of 75%, specificity of 87%, and positive 
predictive value of 86%. GAI-SF score was not related to age, MMSE score, level of 
education or perceived income adequacy. Internal consistency is high (Cronbach's 
α=.81) and concurrent validity against the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory is good (rs 
= .48, p < .001). 
2.4.3 5-item Geriatric Depression Scale (5-item GDS; Hoyl et al., 1999) 
The 5-item GDS (Hoyl et al., 1999) is used to detect the presence of 
depression. The 5-item GDS is a five item questionnaire which can be completed in 
between 1 and 2 minutes (see Appendix H). A score of two or higher indicates 
possible depression. The 5-item GDS has demonstrated a sensitivity of 94%, 
specificity of 81%, and positive predictive value of 81%. The 5-item GDS shows a 
significant agreement with the clinical diagnosis of depression (kappa = .74). The 5-
item GDS had good inter-rater reliability (kappa = .88) and test-retest reliability 
(kappa = .84). 
2.4.4 6-Item Cognitive Impairment Test (6-CIT; Brooke & Bullock, 1999) 
The 6-CIT (Brooke & Bullock, 1999) is used to assess cognition. The 6-CIT 
is a six item questionnaire which can be completed in around 3 minutes (see 
Appendix I). A score of eight or lower indicates possible impairment. The 6-CIT has 
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demonstrated sensitivity for dementia of 92.1% and specificity of 95.6%. The 6-CIT 
was found to correlate strongly with the MMSE (r2 = −.911). 
2.4.5 Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Crawford, 
Smith, Maylor, Della Sala, & Logie, 2003)  
The PRMQ (Crawford et al., 2003) is used to provide a self-report measure 
of prospective and retrospective memory slips in everyday life (see Appendix J). It 
consists of sixteen items, eight asking about prospective memory failures, and eight 
concerning retrospective failures. The questionnaire takes around 5 minutes to 
complete. Answers are completed with a five point likert scale ranging from “never” 
to “very often.” The PRMQ shows high internal consistency, with the reliability on 
Cronbach's alpha being .89 for the total scale, .84 for prospective memory scale, and 
.80 for the retrospective memory scale (Crawford, Henry, Ward, & Blake, 2006). 
2.4.6 Item Adapted from the Fear of Developing Alzheimer’s Disease Scale 
(FADS; French et al., 2012) 
An item adapted from The Fear of Alzheimer's Disease Scale (FADS; 
French, Floyd, Wilkins, & Osato, 2012) was used to assess apprehension about 
developing Alzheimer’s disease (see Appendix K). The original questionnaire 
consists of 30 likert scale items and can be completed in around 5 minutes. Internal 
consistency was high (Cronbach's α = .94) and concurrent validity against the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory was good (r = .216, p = .03). This study used only item 9 
from this questionnaire - “I think that I will probably get Alzheimer’s disease, and it 
frightens me”, with participants being asked to rate how much they agree with this 
statement on a four point likert scale. 
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2.4.7 Additional Questions 
An additional questionnaire was used to obtain demographic information 
from participants in each sample (See Appendix L). The following information was 
recorded; age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, highest qualification achieved, 
current/previous occupation, and current medications. Participants were asked 
additionally to provide self report ratings of quality of life and of physical health 
using a four point likert scale. 
2.4.8 Experimental Task Measures 
 These measures were administered following both the initial check (See 
Appendix M) and again following the final check of the stove (See Appendix N). 
These measures were the same as those used in van den Hout and Kindt’s (2003a, 
2003b, 2004) original series of experiments. 
2.4.8.1 Memory accuracy 
Participants were asked to indicate on a schematic drawing of the stove top, 
which three burners they had been asked to check during the most recent checking 
trial. Memory accuracy scores were the number of stove knobs (scored out of three) 
correctly recalled. 
2.4.8.2 Memory confidence 
Participants were asked to rate how confident they were that the three burners 
they had indicated were those they had been asked to check during the most recent 
checking trial, on a scale of 0 to 100. Participants were told that a score of 0 represents 
“not at all confident” and that a score of 100 represents “extremely confident”. 
2.4.8.3 Vividness and detail 
Participants were asked to rate the vividness and detail of their memory for the 
most recent checking trial on a scale of 0 to 100. Participants were told that vividness 
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refers to the clarity and intensity of their recollection, while detail refers to their ability 
to remember particular visual features of the last checking trial. Participants were told 
that a score of 0 represents “not at all” and that a score of 100 represents “extremely”.  
2.4.8.4 “Remembering” vs. “knowing” 
Participants were asked to indicate whether their memory for the most recent 
trial was consistent with “remembering” the event, or just “knowing” that it 
happened. A description of this distinction, adapted from Radomsky et al., (2006), 
was provided to them. Participants were told that: “Knowing” that the knobs are all 
off means that you have a general sense that they are off. Even if you do not have a 
concrete memory, you just know they are turned off. For example, your memory of 
tying your shoes this morning is probably “known” as opposed to “remembered”. 
“Remembering” that the knobs are turned off means you can go through your 
memory and bring up a memory of the act (with specific features) of turning them 
off. For example, your memory of meeting me for the first time today is probably 
“remembered” as opposed to just “known”. 
2.5 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval to conduct this study was obtained from the NRES East of 
England – Essex Research Ethics Committee (Appendix O). 
2.5.1 Consent 
Potential participants were not approached to take part in the study unless 
they had given their consent to be contacted. Information sheets for the study were 
given to potential participants at least 24 hours in advance of taking part in the study 
(see Appendix P), so that they had sufficient time to give their informed consent to 
participate. In addition to containing details about the study and what would be 
required if they choose to participate, the information sheet also explained issues 
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around confidentiality and data protection. Permission was also sought to inform the 
participants’ General Practitioners that they were taking part in the study (see 
Appendix Q). Prior to beginning the experiment, participants were asked to complete 
a consent form (see Appendix R) and were reminded of the voluntary nature of the 
study as well as their right to withdraw at any time without it affecting their care. 
2.5.2 Distress  
It was anticipated that some participants might experience some distress or 
concerns around their memory. This was addressed within the participant 
information sheet and was discussed with participants both prior to and after taking 
part. Any cases where a participant reported significant concerns around their 
memory, they would be signposted to their GP. Following completion of the task and 
questionnaires, participants were debriefed (Appendix S) and any questions or 
concerns the participant had about the research were addressed. If there were any 
signs of distress during the assessment, participants were reminded that participation 
was voluntary and that they were free to withdraw at any point. Any incidents of 
distress were also noted in the research logbook and discussed with the primary 
research supervisor. 
2.5.3 Data Storage  
Consent forms and measures were stored securely and separately from one 
another to maintain participant confidentiality. Each participant was allocated a 
unique identification number to allow for data relating to the study to be 
anonymised. Statistical data relating to the study was stored on an encrypted memory 
stick and could only be accessed by individuals involved in the project. Upon 
completion of the study, consent forms and measures will be stored in a locked 
 43 
archive room at the University of East Anglia for 10 years, in line with UEA 
research Data Management Policy, following which they will be destroyed.  
2.6 Procedure 
The sample of older people was recruited through memory clinics in Norfolk 
and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT) and North East London NHS Foundation 
Trust (NELFT) and voluntary sector services in Norfolk and Suffolk. The sample of 
individuals with MCI was recruited through memory clinics in Norfolk and Suffolk 
NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT) and North East London NHS Foundation Trust 
(NELFT). Managers and clinicians of potential contributing sites were contacted via 
telephone or email to inform them of the research and the process for identifying 
eligible individuals for the study. Potential participants who met the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were informed of the study by clinicians within these teams. If 
participants were agreeable to being contacted regarding the study, they were asked 
if their name and contact details could be shared with the researcher to discuss the 
study in greater detail and be invited to take part. The researcher then contacted 
potential participants and briefly outlined the study and the participant information 
sheet (Appendix P) was posted to them, this is outlined in telephone script 1 
(Appendix T). If agreeable participants were then contacted after a few days to book 
the appointment as well as to answer any questions they may have at this stage of the 
process, this is outlined in telephone script 2 (Appendix T).  
Participants were tested individually at a location of their choice, including a 
bookable room at UEA or a quiet location within their home. Participants were 
reimbursed for travel to and from the assessment if they choose to have this at a 
location other than their home. All meetings complied with Norfolk & Suffolk NHS 
Foundation Trust (NSFT) and UEA lone working policy. During the assessment the 
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participant information sheet (Appendix P) was reviewed and the individual had an 
opportunity to ask any remaining questions. If they were happy to proceed, 
participants were then asked to complete a consent form (see Appendix R). Once 
participants had given their informed consent to take part in the study, the researcher 
allocated a sequential study serial number and determined their random allocation.  
There were four potential allocation groups to which participants could be 
randomised which were combinations of the two checking conditions 
(relevant/irrelevant checking) and the order of training phase (stove-dosette 
box/dosette box-stove). A blocked randomisation method was used, with random 
permuted blocks of either four or eight. Randomisation was administered by a staff 
member within the Department of Clinical Psychology at UEA independent of the 
research study, using Sealed Envelope (www.sealedenvelope.com). The allocations 
for the older adult and MCI samples were held in two separate sets of opaque sealed 
envelopes which corresponded to the allocated study serial numbers and were held 
by another individual independent of the research. The allocation was not revealed to 
the researcher until after the consent process had been completed, at which point the 
researcher contacted this individual to request the opening of the sealed envelope 
corresponding to the participants allocated study serial number. 
Participants were trained how to check either the stove followed by the 
dosette box or the dosette box followed by the stove, with this counterbalanced 
between participants. Participants were trained to “turn-on”, “turn-off” and then 
“check” the complete set of knobs on the stove in a standardised fashion. To perform 
a check participants were required to physically manipulate the knobs to ensure that 
they were in the off position. They were also trained to “open”, “remove the 
capsule”, “close” and then “check” a compartment of a dosette box in a standardised 
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fashion. To check the compartment of the dosette box the participants were required 
to open and then close the lid of the compartment. Participants were informed that 
following the training phase the researcher would not be giving feedback for any of 
the remaining tasks.  
Following this participants completed the pre-checking trial where they were 
asked to “turn-on”, then “turn-off” and finally to “check” a set of three knobs on the 
stove according to the procedures that they had just learned. All instructions were 
given verbally to participants. The stove stimulus was then removed from view of 
the participant. Participants were then asked to indicate the three knobs they had 
checked, to rate their confidence, vividness and detail of their memory for this check 
(on a scale of 0-100) in addition to whether they remembered checking or just knew 
they had checked on a response sheet (see Appendix M). 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the relevant checking 
condition, where they completed an additional 15 sets of trials using the stove, or the 
irrelevant checking condition, where they instead completed 15 sets of trials using 
the dosette box. 15 repeated checking trials were chosen as previous research has 
demonstrated that significant reductions in metamemory occur after as few as five to 
ten checks (Coles et al., 2006). Each trial had a “turn-on/open and remove the 
capsule”, “turn-off/close” and a “check” instruction for a randomised set of three 
knobs or a randomised individual compartment on the dosette box and there were 
two lists detailing the order of these that was used to provide instructions to 
participants (Appendix D, Appendix E). Following each instruction, the 
experimenter waited for the participant to complete each task within a trial before 
continuing.  
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After completion of these trials, all participants were given a final post-
checking trial where they were again asked to “turn-on”, then “turn-off” and finally 
to “check” a set of three knobs on the stove, following which the stove stimulus was 
removed from view of the participant.  Participants once again were asked to indicate 
which three knobs they had checked on the most recent trial, whether they remember 
or just know that they checked as well as rating their memory confidence, vividness 
and detail of their memory for this final check on a response sheet (see Appendix N). 
A detailed outline and script for the experimental procedure is given in Appendix U. 
Following this, all participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
package including demographic information, a measure of cognition (6-CIT, Brooke 
& Bullock, 1999), self-report measures of symptoms of depression (5-item GDS, 
Hoyl et al., 1999) and anxiety (GAI-SF, Byrne & Pachana, 2011), of prospective and 
retrospective failures in everyday life (PRMQ, Crawford et al., 2003) and an item 
adapted from the Fear of Developing Alzheimer’s Disease Scale (FADS; French et 
al., 2012) (see Appendix K). Following completion of these tasks participants were 
given the follow up information sheet (Appendix S), which provided further 
information about the project and details for whom the participant should contact if 
they wanted further information. Participants were then given an opportunity to ask 
questions, feedback to the researcher and were thanked for their participation. In 
total, involvement in the study lasted approximately 1 hour. Following this, a letter 
was sent to the participant’s GP to confirm their participation and provide 
information on the study (Appendix Q). 
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3.0 Results 
This chapter begins by outlining the treatment of the data and providing basic 
information on the demographic characteristics of the older adult and MCI samples. 
Descriptive data for all variables, in the main analyses are provided, with 
consideration given to the normality of distributions. Comparisons between 
experimental conditions on potential confounding variables for both samples are 
reported. The primary research questions are explored by testing the effect of 
experimental condition (relevant checking and irrelevant checking) on all dependent 
variables (memory accuracy, memory confidence, vividness and detail). Further 
analyses are then reported exploring the secondary research questions. Due to 
challenges with recruitment it is acknowledged that a number of inferential statistical 
tests are under-powered as a result and as such caution is advised when interpreting 
the findings.  
3.1 Treatment of Data 
The data was entered into SPSS (Version 22) and screened for errors, missing 
values, and out of range responses in the raw data. To rule out any mistakes in the 
data entry process all unusual responses were checked against responses in the raw 
data. There were no missing data. 
3.2 Demographics 
The demographics of both the older adult and MCI samples and of each 
experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) were explored and are 
displayed in Table 1. The mean age of participants in the community dwelling non-
clinical older adult sample was 73.25 years, with a standard deviation of 4.80 years 
and an age range for this sample of 64 to 83. The majority of the sample were white 
British (80%), with the remainder of the sample consisting of, any other white 
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background (10%) and Asian (10%). A total of 60% of the sample had undertaken 
some form of further education following leaving school, while the remaining 40% 
had no further qualification after leaving school. The majority of the sample rated 
their quality of life (70%) and physical health (55%) as good or excellent opposed to 
fair or poor. 
The MCI sample had a mean of 70.21 years, with a standard deviation of 
9.15 years and an age range of this sample was 51 to 81. Similarly the majority of 
the sample were white British (71.4%), with the remainder of the sample consisting 
of, Asian (21.3%) and any other white background (7.1%). 57.1% of the sample had 
undertaken some form of further education following leaving school, while the 
remaining 42.9% had received no further qualifications after leaving school. The 
majority of the MCI sample rated their quality of life (100%) and physical health 
(57.1%) as good or excellent opposed to fair or poor. 
Table 1 
Demographics for the older adult and MCI samples 
 n Males Females Mean age in years 
(SD) 
Older adults sample 20 10 10 73.25 (4.80) 
Relevant checking 10 4 6 71.90 (3.32) 
Irrelevant checking 10 6 4 74.60 (5.80) 
     
MCI sample 14 4 10 70.21 (9.15) 
Relevant checking 7 1 6 70.14 (8.80) 
Irrelevant checking 7 3 4 70.29 (10.19) 
Note. n=number of participants. SD=Standard Deviation. MCI= Mild Cognitive 
Impairment.  
 
Data for the two samples were compared on variables of age, gender, marital 
status educational level, physical health status and quality of life to test for 
differences between the groups. In addition a number of psychological measures 
including self reported memory failures, cognition and symptoms of anxiety and 
depression. To account for multiple comparisons and reduce the chance of type I 
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error this analysis used a Bonferroni adjustment, with a corrected p value of .005. 
There were no significant differences between the older adult and MCI sample on 
age, (U = 124.50, p = .59), gender (x2 = 1.56, p = .21), marital status (x2 = 2.138, p = 
.54), level of education (x2 = .971, p = .32), self reported health status (x2 =.486, p = 
.48) and quality of life (x2 = 5.100, p = .02). There was however, a significant 
difference found between the groups in terms of apprehension about dementia (x2 = 
8.993, p = .003), with significantly more individuals in the MCI group reporting 
worry about developing dementia. The MCI sample also were more impaired on the 
6-CIT (U = 243.00, p < .001) and scored higher on the PRMQ (U = 231.50, p = 
.001). There were no significant differences between the older adult and MCI sample 
on scores of the GAI-SF, (U = 124.50, p = .88), 5-item GDS (U = 155.50, p = .59) 
3.3 Descriptive Data 
3.3.1 Geriatric Anxiety Inventory Short Form (GAI-SF) 
Descriptive statistics for the GAI-SF total score are presented in Table 2 for 
each experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) for both the older adult 
and MCI samples. The distribution of the data in the older adult sample did not 
indicate significant skew or kurtosis. The MCI sample irrelevant checking condition 
indicated significant positive skew (z = 2.29, p < .05) and significant positive 
kurtosis (z = 2.37, p < .05). However given the small sample sizes in this study, it is 
recommended that the criterion for significant skew and kurtosis should be raised to 
p < .01 (Clark-Carter, 2004; Field, 2013).  No significant outliers were identified 
using the method recommended by Clark-Carter (2004) to identify potential outliers 
with a standardised score greater than 3 or less than -3. Therefore the data were 
considered to meet the assumptions for normal distribution and not to require 
transformation. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the GAI-SF 
 n Min-max Mean SD  Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Older adult sample 20 0-4 1.50 1.57  .406 -1.44 
Relevant checking 10 0-4 1.10 1.37  1.08 .61 
Irrelevant checking 10 0-4 1.90 1.73  -.13 -2.01 
        
MCI sample 14 0-5 1.57 1.70  1.24* .67 
Relevant checking 7 0-5 1.71 1.80  1.07 .70 
Irrelevant checking 7 0-5 1.43 1.71  1.83* 3.77* 
Note. GAI-SF= Geriatric Anxiety Inventory Short Form. SD=Standard Deviation. n=number 
of participants. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment.  
* p < .05 
 
3.3.2 5-item Geriatric Depression Scale (5-item GDS) 
Descriptive statistics for the 5-item GDS total score are presented in Table 3 
for each experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) for both the older 
adult and MCI samples. There were no significant outliers with a standardised score 
greater than 3 or less than -3 identified in either sample. The distribution of the data 
in the MCI sample did not indicate significant skew or kurtosis. The older adult 
sample relevant checking condition indicated positive skew (z = 2.10, p < .05) 
however as this was not to the p < .01 level (Clark-Carter, 2004; Field, 2013) the 
data were considered to meet the assumptions for normal distribution and to not 
require transformation to reduce bias.  
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics for the 5-item GDS 
 n Min-max Mean SD  Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Older adult sample 20 0-3 .75 1.07  1.13* -.10 
Relevant checking 10 0-3 .70 1.06  1.44* 1.26 
Irrelevant checking 10 0-3 .80 1.36  1.05 -.39 
        
MCI sample 14 0-3 .86 .95  .95 .34 
Relevant checking 7 0-2 .71 .76  .60 -.35 
Irrelevant checking 7 0-3 1.00 1.16  .91 -.15 
Note. GDS= Geriatric Depression Scale. n=number of participants. SD=Standard 
Deviation. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment.  
* p < .05 
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3.3.3 6-Item Cognitive Impairment Test (6-CIT) 
The descriptive statistics for the 6-CIT total score are presented in Table 4 for 
each experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) for both the older adult 
and MCI samples. The distribution of the data in the MCI sample did not indicate 
significant skew or kurtosis. The older adult sample relevant checking condition 
indicated positive skew (z = 2.10, p < .05). However as neither condition indicated 
significant skew or kurtosis at the p<.01 significance level (Clark-Carter, 2004; 
Field, 2013) and none of the conditions contained significant outliers the data were 
considered to meet the assumptions for normal distribution. 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for the 6-CIT 
 n Min-max Mean SD  Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Older adult sample 20 0-6 1.50 1.07  1.17* -.04 
Relevant checking 10 0-4 1.20 1.93  1.04 -1.22 
Irrelevant checking 10 0-6 1.40 2.12  1.44* 1.26 
        
MCI sample 14 2-8 1.57 1.70  .43 -.94 
Relevant checking 7 2-8 4.29 2.69  .80 -1.28 
Irrelevant checking 7 4-8 5.14 1.57  1.12 .27 
Note. 6-CIT= 6-Item Cognitive Impairment Test. n=number of participants. SD=Standard 
Deviation. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
* p < .05 
 
 
3.3.4 Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ) 
The PRMQ contains both a subscale for prospective memory and a subscale 
for retrospective memory as well as producing a total combined score. Descriptive 
statistics for the PRMQ subscales are presented in Table 5 for each experimental 
condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) for both the older adult and MCI samples. 
Scores for the MCI sample irrelevant checking condition showed evidence of 
positive skew (z = 2.38, p < .05) and kurtosis (z = 2.11, p < .05) for the prospective 
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memory subscale. However as z-scores for skewness and kurtosis were not 
significant at the p < .01 level (Clark-Carter, 2004; Field, 2013), the data could be 
considered to be normally distributed and not to require transformation to correct for 
bias. 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics for the subscales and total score of the PRMQ 
 n  Min-max Mean SD  Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Prospective memory subscale of PRMQ 
Older adult sample 20 9-22 15.60 3.75  -.07 -.42 
Relevant checking 10    12-22 17.50 3.50  -.23 -1.10 
Irrelevant checking 10 9-17 13.70 3.06  -.67 -1.08 
        
MCI sample 14 14-37 21.50 6.21  1.20* .60 
Relevant checking 7 14-27 20.86 5.56  -.07 -2.38 
Irrelevant checking 7 17-37 22.14 7.20  1.89* 3.35* 
        
Retrospective memory subscale of PRMQ 
Older adult sample 20 8-21 13.75 3.96  .51 -.68 
Relevant checking 10 10-21 14.50 4.04  .74 -.62 
Irrelevant checking 10 8-20 13.00 3.94  .39 -1.00 
        
MCI sample 14 12-32 19.14 5.57  .92 .57 
Relevant checking 7 14-26 19.43 4.54  .15 -1.59 
Irrelevant checking 7 12-32 18.86 6.82  1.36 1.76 
        
PRMQ total score 
Older adult sample 20 17-43 29.35 6.98  .21 .08 
Relevant checking 10 22-43 32.00 6.55  .75 .38 
Irrelevant checking 10 17-37 26.70 6.65  -.08 -1.33 
        
MCI sample 14 28-69 40.64 11.17  1.31* 1.87 
Relevant Checking 7 28-52 40.29 9.55  .11 -2.07 
Irrelevant checking 7 30-69 41.00 13.38  1.89* 3.93* 
Note. PRMQ= Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire. n=number of 
participants. SD=Standard Deviation. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
* p < .05 
 
3.3.5 Measure of memory confidence 
Van den Hout & Kindt’s (2003) original paradigm made use of visual 
analogue scales to measure memory confidence, vividness and detail while more 
recent studies have made use of ratings from 0 to 100 (Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky 
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et al., 2014). Considerable debate exists over the extent to which these should be 
considered interval or ordinal data (Clark-Carter, 2004; McDowell, 2006), however 
the majority of studies (Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 2014) investigating this 
paradigm have treated the data as interval, with the three metamemory variables 
analysed using 2 x 2 MANOVA to understand the potential interaction of the 
conditions. As the aim of this study is to attempt to replicate these previous findings 
within a new population, for the purposes of this comparison across studies the data 
for memory confidence, vividness and detail will be reported using parametric 
analyses and as such will treated as if it is interval and if it meets assumptions, will 
be analysed using parametric tests. 
Descriptive data for memory confidence pre- and post-repeated checking for 
each experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) for both the older adult 
and MCI samples are presented in Table 6. There were no significant outliers with a 
standardised score greater than 3 or less than -3 identified in either sample (Clark-
Carter, 2004). Scores for the MCI sample irrelevant checking condition post-
repeated checking showed evidence of negative skew (z = -2.23, p < .05) and 
positive kurtosis (z = 2.33, p < .05). Scores for the older adult sample relevant 
checking condition pre-checking showed evidence of negative skew (z = -2.55, p < 
.05). As z scores for skewness and kurtosis were not significant at the p < .01 level, 
data were considered to meet the assumptions for normal distribution (Clark-Carter, 
2004; Field, 2013). 
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for pre- and post-checking memory confidence scores 
 n Min-
max 
Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Pre-repeated checking 
Older adult sample 20      
Relevant checking 10 80-100 95.80 (8.35) 100.00 (7) -1.76* 1.35 
Irrelevant checking 10 75-100 93.00 (8.88) 95.00 (13) -1.32 .69 
Post-repeated checking 
Older adult sample 20      
Relevant checking 10 50-95 74.50 (12.35) 77.50 (13) -.63 1.15 
Irrelevant checking 10 70-100 93.00 (10.33) 97.50 (13) -1.60 1.81 
       
Pre-repeated checking 
MCI sample 14      
Relevant checking 7 80-100 90.00 (10.00) 90.00 (20) .00 -2.60 
Irrelevant checking 7 70-100 89.29 (10.97) 90.00 (20) -.94 .19 
Post-repeated checking 
MCI sample 14      
Relevant checking 7 50-85 66.43 (16.00) 70.00 (30) -.106 -2.51 
Irrelevant checking 7 65-100 90.71 (12.39) 90.00 (10) -1.79* 3.69* 
Note. n=number of participants. SD=Standard Deviation. IQR=Interquartile Range. 
MCI=Mild Cognitive Impairment.  
* p < .05 
 
3.3.6 Measure of memory vividness 
Table 7 presents descriptive data for memory vividness pre- and post-
repeated checking for each experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) 
for both the older adult and MCI samples. The distribution of the data in the MCI 
sample did not indicate significant skew or kurtosis at the p < .01 level.  
Pre-repeated checking scores for the relevant checking condition of the older 
adult sample, indicated significant negative skew (z = -2.98, p < .01) and positive 
kurtosis (z = 3.03, p < .01). Post-relevant repeated checking scores in the older adult 
sample also demonstrated significant negative skew (z = -3.74, p < .001) and positive 
kurtosis (z = 5.30, p < .001). This was addressed using Winsorizing to reduce the 
impact of bias by substituting significant outliers to the next lowest value minus one 
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(Field, 2013). Examination of outliers showed a participant in the older adult 
irrelevant condition to have a significantly lower score, changing this participants 
scores reduced the pre-repeated checking skew (z = -1.86) and kurtosis (z = 0.03) to 
non significant levels. The post-repeated checking score for this participant was 
changed to keep the change difference the same for this participant, this improved 
skew (z = -2.32, p < .05) and kurtosis (z = 1.67) to non significant (p <. 01) levels for 
the post-checking condition.  
The same method was used to address a single outlier for a pre- repeated 
checking score in the relevant checking condition of the older adult sample, which 
improved significantly negative skew (z = -3.02, p < .01 to z = -2.00, p < .05) and 
significant positive kurtosis (z = 3.04, p < .01 to z = 0.13). There were no other 
significant outliers and the resulting data were considered to meet the assumptions 
for normal distribution and used in the analysis. 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for pre- and post-checking memory vividness scores 
 n Min-
max 
Mean (SD) Median 
(IQR) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Pre-repeated checking 
Older adult sample 20      
Relevant checking 10 60-100 93.00 (13.38) 100.00 (13) -2.08** 4.06** 
Irrelevant checking 10 60-100 92.50 (13.18) 100.00 (13) -2.05** 4.05** 
Post-repeated checking 
Older adult sample 20      
Relevant checking 10 40-95 68.50 (17.80) 72.50 (25) -.25 -1.07 
Irrelevant checking 10 60-100 93.50 (12.48) 100.00 (10) -2.57*** 7.08*** 
       
Pre-repeated checking 
MCI sample 14      
Relevant checking 7 90-100 95.71 (4.50) 95.00 (10) -.35 -1.82 
Irrelevant checking 7 75-99 89.86 (7.43) 90.00 (5) -1.36 3.26* 
Post-repeated checking 
MCI sample 14      
Relevant checking 7 25-85 60.00 (21.41) 60.00 (40) -.62 -.47 
Irrelevant checking 7 75-100 88.57 (8.52) 90.00 (15) -.51 -.26 
Note. n=number of participants. SD=Standard Deviation. IQR=Interquartile Range. 
MCI=Mild Cognitive Impairment.  
* p < .05,  ** p < .01,  ***p <.001 
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3.3.7 Measure of memory detail 
Table 8 presents descriptive data for memory detail pre- and post-repeated 
checking for each experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking) for both 
the older adult and MCI samples. The distribution of the data in the MCI sample did 
not indicate significant skew or kurtosis at the p < .01 level.  
Scores for the older adult sample irrelevant checking condition pre-repeated 
checking indicated significant negative skew (z = -2.68, p < .01). Older adult post-
irrelevant repeated checking scores also demonstrated significant negative skew (z = 
-3.74, p < .001) and positive kurtosis (z = 5.30, p < .001). To address skewness and 
kurtosis the sample was examined for significant outliers and these values were 
substituted for the next lowest value minus one (Field, 2013). Examination of 
outliers showed a participant in the older adult irrelevant condition to have a 
significantly lower score, changing this value reduced the skew (z = -1.51) in the 
pre-repeated checking condition to a non significant level. Due to pre- and post-
checking scores being within subjects variables the post-repeated checking score for 
this participant was changed to keep the change difference the same for this 
participant, this improved skew (z = -2.33, p < .05) and kurtosis (z = 1.67) to non 
significant (p < .01) levels for the post-checking condition.  
The same method was used to address a single outlier identified in the older 
adult sample relevant checking condition pre-repeated checking which improved 
significantly negative skew (z = -3.02, p < .01 to z = -2.00, p < .05) and significant 
positive kurtosis (z = 3.04, p < .01 to z = 0.13). There were no other significant 
outliers and the resulting data were considered to meet the assumptions for normal 
distribution. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics for pre- and post-checking memory detail scores 
 n Min-
max 
Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Pre-repeated checking 
Older adult sample 20      
Relevant checking 10 60-100 93.00 (13.38) 100.00 (13) -2.08** 4.06** 
Irrelevant checking 10 60-100 92.00 (13.38) 100.00 (16) -1.84** 3.14* 
Post-repeated checking 
Older adult sample 20      
Relevant checking 10 40-95 70.50 (16.58) 72.50 (22) -.57 -.07 
Irrelevant checking 10 60-100 93.50 (12.48) 100.00 (10) -2.57*** 7.08*** 
       
Pre-repeated checking 
MCI sample 14      
Relevant checking 7 80-100 92.86 (8.09) 95.00 (15) -.67 -1.15 
Irrelevant checking 7 75-99 89.14 (7.08) 90.00 (0) -1.23 3.78* 
Post-repeated checking 
MCI sample 14      
Relevant checking 7 25-100 65.00 (25.66) 70.00 (40) -.41 -.50 
Irrelevant checking 7 75-100 88.57 (8.52) 90.00 (15) -.51 -.26 
Note. n=number of participants. SD=Standard Deviation. IQR=Interquartile Range. 
MCI=Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
* p < .05,  ** p < .01,  *** p <.001 
 
3.4 Baseline Differences between the Experimental Conditions 
Data for the two experimental conditions (relevant or irrelevant checking) 
from both the older adult and MCI samples were compared on variables of age, 
gender, marital status educational level, physical health status and quality of life to 
test for differences at baseline resulting from the random allocation. Baseline group 
comparisons of gender, quality of life, physical health status, marital status and 
educational level were made using a series of Pearson’s chi square analyses, in cases 
where expected frequencies were less than five, Fisher’s exact probability test was 
used (Field, 2013). In addition a number of psychological measures including self 
reported memory failures, cognition and symptoms of anxiety and depression were 
compared between the experimental conditions.  
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There were found to be no significant differences between relevant and 
irrelevant checking conditions in the older adult sample on age, (t (18) = .1.28, p = 
.22), gender (Fisher’s exact test (2-sided), p = .66), marital status (x2 = 1.067, p = 
.59), level of education (Fisher’s exact test (2-sided), p = 1.00), self reported health 
status (Fisher’s exact test, p = .37 (2-sided) and quality of life (Fisher’s exact test (2-
sided), p = 1.00). There were no significant differences between the relevant and 
irrelevant checking conditions in the older adult sample on scores of the GAI-SF, (U 
= 36.50, p = .28), 5-item GDS (U = 48.50, p = .91), 6-CIT (U = 46.50, p = .76) and 
PRMQ (U = 30.50, p = .14).  
Similarly there were found to be no significant differences between the 
relevant and irrelevant checking conditions in the MCI sample in age, (t (12) = .-0.28, 
p = .98), gender (Fisher’s exact test (2-sided), p = .56), marital status (x2 = 3.00, p = 
.39), level of education (Fisher’s exact test (2-sided), p = .59), self reported health 
status (Fisher’s exact test, p = .59 (2-sided) and quality of life with all 14 participants 
rating quality of life good or excellent. There were no significant differences 
between the relevant and irrelevant checking conditions in the older adult sample on 
scores of the GAI-SF, (U = 22.00, p = .74), 5-item GDS (U = 22.00, p = .73), 6-CIT 
(U = 17.00, p = .31) and PRMQ (U = 23.50, p = .90). 
3.5 Research Questions 
3.5.1 Research Question 1: Does repeated relevant checking lead to significantly 
reduced memory confidence, vividness and detail for recall in older people and 
people with MCI, when compared to an irrelevant checking condition? 
The first research question sought to examine whether relevant checking led 
to significant reductions in memory confidence, vividness and detail in the older 
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adult and MCI samples. Descriptive information regarding mean scores for the older 
adult sample for memory confidence vividness and detail are displayed in Table 9.  
Table 9 
Descriptive data for memory confidence, vividness and detail in older adult sample 
 Confidence 
Mean (SD) 
Vividness 
Mean (SD) 
Detail 
Mean (SD) 
 
Pre-repeated checking 
Relevant checking 95.80 (8.35) 94.90 (8.70) 94.90 (8.70) 
Irrelevant checking 93.00 (8.88) 94.40 (8.51) 93.90 (8.94) 
    
Post-repeated checking 
Relevant checking 74.50 (12.35) 70.40 (15.26) 72.40 (13.49) 
Irrelevant checking 93.00 (10.33) 95.40 (7.11) 95.40 (7.11) 
 
Note. SD=Standard Deviation. 
 
Given the small sample sizes achieved within this study, planned statistical 
tests using a 2 x 2 MANOVA to combine the analysis of these variables for 
theoretical reasons as part of a wider construct ‘metamemory’ were not attempted. 
When working with small sample sizes univariate approaches are preferred over 
multivariate approaches as they tend to be more powerful (Field, 2013). Instead three 
separate 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the individual 
dependent variables that make up metamemory (memory confidence, vividness and 
detail). Figure 1 represents the interactions being investigated by these tests. To 
account for multiple comparisons and reduce the chance of type I error this analysis 
used a Bonferroni adjustment, with a corrected p value of .017.  
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Figure 1 Older adult sample metamemory scores across pre- and post-
repeated checking 
Three separate 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the 
individual dependent variables that make up meta-memory (memory confidence, 
vividness and detail) for the purposes of this analysis they will be reported together. 
The between subjects independent variable in these analyses was condition (relevant 
vs. irrelevant checking) while the within subjects independent variable was time 
(pre- vs. post-repeated checking).  
Exploration of the main effects and interaction of the 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVAs, revealed a significant main effect of time (pre- vs. post-repeated 
checking) on memory confidence, F(1,18) = 22.78, p > .001 (η2p = .56), vividness, 
F(1,18) = 17.99, p > .001 (η2p = .50) and detail, F(1,18) = 20.73, p > .001 (η2p = .54). 
Overall, participants rated themselves lower on memory confidence, vividness and 
detail following repeated checking. There was also a significant main effect of 
condition (relevant vs. irrelevant checking) for vividness, F(1,18) = 10.80, p = .004 
(η2p =.38), and detail, F(1,18) = 8.59, p = .009 (η2p =.32), but not for memory 
confidence, F(1,18) = 4.00, p = .61 (η2p =.18). Overall, participants in the relevant 
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checking condition rated themselves lower on memory vividness and detail than 
those in the irrelevant checking condition. 
Notably, there was observed to be a significant interaction between time (pre- 
vs. post-repeated checking) and condition (relevant vs. irrelevant checking) for 
memory confidence, F(1,18) = 22.78, p > .001 (η2p = .56), vividness,  F(1,18) = 
21.19, p > .001 (η2p =.54), and detail, F(1,18) = 27.07, p > .001 (η2p =.60). 
Participants in the relevant checking condition had reduced scores in all three 
metamemory variables compared to those in the irrelevant checking condition 
following repeated checking. These results indicate that repeated checking leads to 
reduced memory vividness and detail as well as reduced memory confidence, 
replicating the findings of van den Hout & Kindt (20031; 2003b; 2004) and 
Radomsky et al., (2006; 2014) within an older adults sample. 
A similar analysis was undertaken to further test this effect within the MCI 
sample. Descriptive information regarding mean scores for the MCI sample for 
memory confidence vividness and detail are displayed in Table 10. As with the 
analysis of the older adult sample, a 2 x 2 MANOVA was not attempted and instead 
three separate 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the individual 
dependent variables that make up meta-memory (memory confidence, vividness and 
detail). Figure 2 represents the interactions being investigated by these tests.  
Table 10 
Descriptive data for memory confidence, vividness and detail in MCI sample 
 Confidence 
Mean (SD) 
Vividness 
Mean (SD) 
Detail 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-repeated checking 
Relevant checking 90.00 (10.00) 95.71 (4.50) 92.86 (8.09) 
Irrelevant checking 89.29 (10.97) 89.86 (7.43) 89.14 (7.08) 
    
Post-repeated checking 
Relevant checking 66.43 (15.99) 60.00 (21.40) 65.00 (25.66) 
Irrelevant checking 90.71 (12.39) 88.57 (8.52) 88.57 (8.52) 
Note. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment. SD=Standard Deviation. 
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Figure 2 MCI sample metamemory scores across pre- and post-repeated 
checking 
Three separate 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the 
individual dependent variables for the MCI sample that make up meta-memory 
(memory confidence, vividness and detail) for the purposes of this analysis they will 
be reported together. The between subjects independent variable in these analyses 
was condition (relevant vs. irrelevant checking) while the within subjects 
independent variable was time (pre- vs. post-repeated checking). To account for 
multiple comparisons and reduce the chance of type I error this analysis used a 
Bonferroni adjustment, with a corrected p value of 0.017. 
The 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs failed to reveal a statistically 
significant effect of time for memory confidence, F(1,12) = 7.17, p = .02 (η2p = .37), 
vividness, F(1,12) = 6.70, p = .02 (η2p = .36), and detail, F(1,12) = 6.70, p = .024 (η2p 
= .36). There was no significant main effect of condition for memory confidence, 
F(1,12) = 4.98, p = .045 (η2p = .29), vividness F(1,12) = 3.25, p  = .096 (η2p = .29), or 
detail F(1,12) = 3.25, p = .09 (η2p =.21). Given the corrected p value, a statistically 
significant interaction was not found for both memory vividness, F(1,12) = 6.17, p = 
.03 (η2p = .29)  and memory detail, F(1,12) = 6.17, p = .02 (η2p = .34). Despite the 
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conservative p value used within this analysis, there was observed to be a significant 
interaction between time and condition for memory confidence, F(1,12) = 9.14, p  = 
.01 (η2p = .43) indicating that participants in the relevant checking condition had 
reduced scores in memory confidence compared to those in the irrelevant checking 
condition following repeated checking. 
This finding confirms that repeated checking leads to doubt in both older 
people and individuals with MCI, however of particular interest is whether there is a 
differential effect of repeated checking on memory confidence. To compare if there 
were differences in the ratings of memory confidence either before checking or as a 
result of checking between the MCI and older adult samples, both pre-checking 
scores and post-checking scores in the relevant checking condition were compared 
using independent samples t-tests. MCI and older adult samples were found not to be 
significantly different in ratings of memory confidence prior to repeated checking t 
(32) = 1.49, p = .15 or following repeated checking t (15) = 1.18, p = .26. This 
finding would suggest that individuals with MCI do not experience greater 
reductions in memory confidence as a result of repeated checking that older adults 
without objective memory problems. 
3.5.2 Research Question 2: Does repeated relevant checking lead to significant 
reductions in memory accuracy in older people and people with MCI, when 
compared to an irrelevant checking condition? 
The second research question examined whether repeated relevant checking 
led to significant reductions in memory accuracy compared to irrelevant checking. 
Figure 3 displays mean accuracy scores pre- and post-repeated checking in the older 
adult sample for both experimental conditions (relevant and irrelevant checking). 
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Figure 4 displays mean accuracy scores pre- and post-repeated checking in the MCI 
sample for both experimental conditions (relevant and irrelevant checking).  
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Figure 3 Older adult sample memory accuracy scores pre- and post-repeated 
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Figure 4 MCI sample memory accuracy scores pre- and post-repeated 
checking 
The planned quantitative analysis of these changes using a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
was not attempted as assumptions for planned statistical tests were not met. Memory 
accuracy was high for both experimental conditions at pre- and post-checking. The 
data for both the older adult and MCI samples were recoded from a score out of three 
to correct and incorrect responses. Table 11 displays data on the number of 
participants both pre- and post-repeated checking in each experimental condition 
(relevant or irrelevant checking) who accurately remembered the corresponding 
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numbers of the three stove hobs checked on the last trial. Comparisons of post- 
repeated checking memory accuracy were made using Pearson’s chi square analyses, 
which showed that there was no significant difference between the relevant or 
irrelevant checking in both the older sample, x2 = 2.22, p = .14, and MCI sample, x2 
= 2.33, p = .13. 
Table 11 
Descriptive data on memory accuracy (proportion of participants making no mistakes) 
 Pre-repeated checking 
 
Post-repeated checking 
 
                         Older adults sample (n = 20) 
Relevant checking 8 (80%) 8 (80%) 
Irrelevant checking 8 (80%) 10 (10%) 
   
                       MCI sample (n = 14) 
Relevant checking 6 (85.7%) 5 (71.4%) 
Irrelevant checking 5 (71.4%) 7 (100%) 
Note. n=number of participants. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
 
3.5.3 Research Question 3: Does repeated relevant checking result in older 
people and people with MCI having a general sense of “knowing” that a check 
has been completed rather than a specific memory of completing the check? 
The third research question examined whether repeated relevant checking led 
to significant differences in source of memory (remembering vs. knowing) compared 
to irrelevant checking. Comparisons of whether participants “remember” or just 
“know” they performed the last check following repeated checking were made using 
Fisher’s exact probability test. Fisher’s exact probability test was chosen in place of 
Pearson’s chi square analyses, as it was expected that the analysis would involve 
frequencies less than five (Field, 2013). Table 12 displays data for “remember” and 
“know” responses for participants both pre- and post-repeated checking in each 
experimental condition (relevant or irrelevant checking). 
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Table 12 
Descriptive data on remembering vs. knowing 
 Pre-repeated checking Post-repeated checking 
 Remembering Knowing Remembering Knowing 
                         Older adults sample (n = 20) 
Relevant checking 10 (100%) 0 (0%) 4 (40%) 6 (60%) 
Irrelevant checking 10 (100%) 0 (0%) 10 (0%) 0 (0%) 
     
                       MCI sample (n = 14) 
Relevant checking 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 6 (85.7 %) 1 (14.3%) 
Irrelevant checking 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Note. n=number of participants. MCI= Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
Figure 5 displays data for “remember” and “know” responses in the older 
adult sample post-repeated checking for both experimental conditions (relevant or 
irrelevant checking). There were found to be no significant differences between 
relevant and irrelevant checking conditions in the older adult sample pre-checking 
with 100% of participants in both conditions reported being able to ‘remember’ their 
final check. At post-checking, significantly more participants in the relevant 
checking condition reported just “knowing” which knobs they had checked on the 
final checking trial as opposed to “remembering” checking them (Fisher’s Exact Test 
(2-sided), p = .01).  
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Figure 5 Number of participants reporting “remember” vs. “know” responses 
in the older adult sample post-repeated checking 
Figure 6 displays data for “remember” and “know” responses in the MCI 
sample post-repeated checking for both experimental conditions (relevant or 
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irrelevant checking). To examine whether this same effect was found in the MCI 
sample an analysis of post-checking responses was undertaken. A similar pattern of 
responses was found in the MCI sample, pre-checking there were no significant 
differences between the relevant and irrelevant checking conditions with 100% of 
participants in both conditions reporting being able to “remember” their final check. 
However post-checking, significantly more participants in the relevant checking 
condition reported just “knowing” as opposed to being able to “remember” which 
knobs they had checked on the final checking trial (Fisher’s Exact Test (2-sided), p = 
.05). 
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Figure 6 Number of participants reporting “remember” vs. “know” responses 
in the MCI sample post-repeated checking 
3.5.4 Research Question 4: Do older people and individuals with MCI with a 
greater apprehension about developing Alzheimer’s disease report a higher 
incidence of prospective memory slips in everyday life? 
The fourth research question concerned differences in reported incidences of 
prospective memory slips in everyday life between those who rated themselves high and 
those who rated themselves low in apprehension about developing dementia. There were 
found to be no statistically significant difference in reported prospective memory 
failures between the low and high apprehension groups, U = 196.00, p = .051. 
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4.0 Discussion 
This chapter evaluates the results in relation to the research questions and in 
the context of the research literature. The methodology of the study is appraised, 
including a discussion of research design, participants, randomisation and blinding, 
statistical power, measures and experimental task procedure. Theoretical and clinical 
implications as well as directions for future research are considered. 
4.1 Evaluation of Findings 
4.1.1 Research Question 1 
 Results of the current study (see section 3.5.1) demonstrate that relevant 
checking lead to statistically significant reductions in metamemory (memory 
confidence, vividness and detail) for older people without cognitive decline. 
Statistically significant declines in memory confidence, vividness, and detail were 
found for individuals in the older adult sample from pre- to post-repeated checking 
as evidenced in section 3.5.1. Reductions in metamemory were found to be 
significantly greater for individuals in the relevant checking condition, who were 
asked to repeatedly check the model stove, than for those in irrelevant checking 
condition, who were asked to repeated check a dosette box.  
The current paradigm elaborated upon an existing research protocol 
(Radomsky et al., 2006; 2014), adapting it for use in a naturalistic environment and 
introducing a novel irrelevant checking task which was more ecologically valid for 
use with older people. Despite changes to the stove paradigm used, findings are 
consistent with previous research on physical checking, including computer based 
stove tasks (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; 2003b; 2004) and laboratory based stove 
tasks (Radomsky et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 2014).  
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In contrast to results for the relevant checking condition, there were no 
statistically significant declines in ratings of memory confidence, vividness and 
detail in the irrelevant checking condition as shown by the interaction effect (see 
section 3.5.1), suggesting that the effect seen in this paradigm is not related more 
generally to the act of checking but is specific to the repeated checking of the target 
object. This finding supports van den Hout and Kindt (2003b) who proposed that 
reductions in metamemory seen following repeated checking are the result of 
increased familiarity with the object being checked, rather than due to any 
uncertainty or anxiety inducing effect of being repeatedly required to perform 
checks. 
Interestingly this reduction in ratings of memory vividness and detail 
following relevant repeated checking was not replicated in the smaller sample of 
individuals with MCI as no significant interaction was observed given the corrected 
p values for a Bonferroni adjustment (see section 3.5.1). However the small sample 
size means that it is important to be cautious with the interpretation of this finding 
and to note that both were approaching significance despite the conservative p value 
used within this analysis.  
Statistically significant declines in memory confidence were found for 
individuals with MCI asked to repeatedly check the model stove, both compared to 
pre-test scores following only one checking trial of the stove, and compared to the 
irrelevant checking group who were asked to engage in repeated checking of a 
dosette box (see section 3.5.1). The small sample size meant that comparison of the 
two samples was not conducted as the main focus of the study, however this finding 
does provide preliminary evidence that the effects on memory confidence following 
repeated checking seen in non-clinical samples, similarly affect individuals with 
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objective memory problems. This would seem to confirm that reductions in memory 
confidence and perhaps vividness and detail should be considered an expected 
outcome following repeated checking in spite of differences in general memory 
confidence and ability.  
4.1.2 Research Question 2 
In the current study, no evidence was found for a statistically significant 
reduction in memory accuracy following repeated relevant checking with either the 
older adult or MCI samples. However it must be noted that due to limited sample 
size and the data not meeting required assumptions for a 2 x 2 ANOVA, more 
detailed statistical analysis was not attempted.  
There was no statistically significant difference in post-checking memory 
accuracy scores for older people with and without memory decline asked to 
repeatedly check the model stove compared to the irrelevant checking group who 
were asked to engage in repeated checking of a dosette box (see section 3.5.2). The 
current study failed to replicate findings utilising a real stove which showed 
differences in memory accuracy following relevant repeated checking (Ashbaugh & 
Radomsky, 2007; Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky, Gilchrist, et al., 2006) but was 
consistent with earlier studies utilising the computerised stove task (van den Hout & 
Kindt; 2003a; 2003b; 2004). 
Reductions in memory accuracy following repeated relevant checking remain 
an area of debate within the research literature (Medway & Jones, 2013; Radomsky 
et al., 2014). There are a number of contradictory findings, however the majority of 
studies that have found small but significant reductions in memory accuracy 
following repeated checking have utilised the functional stove paradigm (Radomsky 
et al., 2006; 2014). It is argued differences in findings may be related to the 
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ecological validity of a real stove rather than a computerised stove leading to an 
increase in perceived threat (Radomsky et al., 2006). However the observed 
differences in memory accuracy may also be explained by changes to the paradigm 
such as using only a single removable plastic knob to operate all six hobs which may 
have artificially increased the difficulty of this task. It is arguable lab-based 
paradigms are themselves flawed and lack ecological validity and one of the aims of 
this study was to conduct the experiment in a more naturalistic setting and to produce experimental 
stimuli that more closely approximate the real equipment. 
While the current study found no statistically significant difference in 
memory accuracy (see section 3.5.2) between relevant and irrelevant checking for 
either the older adult or MCI sample, this may be at least in part related to 
methodology and limitations of the measure of memory accuracy (a detailed critique 
of the methodology is given in section 4.2). It is also possible that any impact of 
repeated relevant checking on memory accuracy may be more subtle than observed 
reductions in metamemory and that due the small sample sizes within the present 
study (see section 3.2), it was underpowered to detect such an effect.  
 
4.1.3 Research Question 3 
The results of the current study demonstrate that following repeated relevant 
checking older people report a more general sense of “knowing” that a check has 
been completed rather that reporting being able to “remember” a detailed specific 
memory of their final check. There was a statistically significant difference in post-
checking ratings of source of memory between the relevant and irrelevant conditions 
with significantly more reporting “knowing” in the relevant checking condition (see 
section 3.5.3). This replicates previous findings of statistically significant difference 
in post-checking ratings of source of memory between the relevant and irrelevant 
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conditions with an adult population using both the computerised stove task (van den 
Hout & Kindt, 2003b; 2004) and laboratory based functional stove task (Coles et al. 
2006; Radomsky et al., 2006).  
Van den Hout and Kindt (2004) proposed that this change from having a 
specific detailed memory of the check to a more general sense of “knowing” that the 
check has been completed occurs due to decreased encoding of perceptual details 
following repeated checking. Van den Hout and Kindt (2004) argued that while 
responsibility and other factors may lead someone to begin checking, it was the 
reductions of vividness and detail of memory following repetition that produced a 
statistically significant change in the source of memory from visual/perceptual 
processing (i.e., “remembering”) to more semantic/conceptual processing (i.e., 
‘‘knowing’’).  
As with reductions in memory confidence, the change from reporting having 
a specific memory of the final check of the stove to just knowing that it had been 
completed was replicated in the smaller sample of individuals with MCI. There was 
a statistically significant difference in post-checking ratings of source memory with 
significantly more reporting “knowing” in the relevant checking condition than in 
the irrelevant checking condition (see section 3.5.3). However, the small sample size 
requires caution in the interpretation of these findings. These findings would appear 
to conflict with van den Hout & Kindt’s (2004) findings as changes in memory 
vividness and detail post-relevant checking were found to not be statistically 
significant (see section 3.5.2). However as previously noted, it is important to be 
cautious with the interpretation of this finding and to note that both were 
approaching significance despite the conservative p value used within this analysis. 
These findings offer some support for van den Hout & Kindt’s (2004) conclusions 
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and indicate that, as has been shown in adult populations, older people and people 
with MCI switch to a more semantic source of memory in the absence of more vivid 
and detailed memories following repeated relevant checking.  
4.1.4 Research Question 4 
In the current study, no evidence was found for a statistically significant difference 
in reported prospective memory slips between those who rated themselves as high or 
low in apprehension about developing dementia (see section 3.5.4). The relationship 
between fear of developing a dementia and self reports of prospective memory 
(remembering to perform intended actions in the future) was of particular interest in 
relation to the current study as negative beliefs and diminished confidence in 
prospective memory have been shown to cause increased doubt and urges to engage 
in checking behaviour (Cuttler et al., 2013). Individuals with MCI have been shown 
to experience difficulties with prospective memory (Costa et al, 2010; Thompson et 
al.,, 2010), which was reflected in the findings as there were statistically significant 
differences between the MCI and older adult samples for PRMQ score and rating of 
fear of developing dementia (see section 3.2). This may mean that individuals with 
MCI may be particularly at risk of diminished confidence in prospective memory 
and engaging in checking.  
4.2 Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
4.2.1 Design 
 The current study utilised a between groups experimental design to test the 
effect of repeated checking on memory and metamemory within an older adult and 
an MCI sample. The use of an experimental design to test this effect provides a 
number of advantages notably increasing internal validity, allowing for conclusions 
to be reached regarding causality due to the manipulation of independent variables. 
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The use of a between groups design required participants to be randomised to either 
a relevant or irrelevant checking condition, therefore participants were not matched 
across condition. However analysis of these randomised groups showed that they did 
not differ on baseline measures or other potential confounding variable such as age 
or gender (see section 3.2). The use of an irrelevant checking condition as a control 
has been well utilised within similar paradigms (Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 
2006; van den Hout & Kindt, 2004) and has advantages over a “no checking” control 
as groups are well matched in terms of cognitive load and both groups complete 
similar checking tasks. 
4.2.2 Participants 
This study represents the first attempt to adapt the stove paradigm to examine 
the effect of repeated checking in both an older adults sample and a sample of 
individuals with objective memory difficulties (MCI). Previous paradigms have 
chosen to test this experimental effect predominately in younger non-clinical, student 
samples (Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 2006; van den Hout & Kindt, 2004). 
Results from these studies report reductions in metamemory and slight reductions 
memory accuracy (Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 2006) following repeated 
checking, demonstrating that doubt following checking is not exclusively a clinical 
phenomenon. A number of studies have since replicated findings demonstrating that 
checking increases doubt rather than reducing it, within a clinical OCD population 
(Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Radomsky et al., 2014). It is important to note that 
these studies did not attempt to address the idiosyncratic concerns of individuals 
with OCD. As with the majority of previous studies, the current study used a non-
clinical population of older adults in addition to a smaller clinical sample of older 
people with MCI to explore basic processes and vulnerability factors. A non-clinical 
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sample was identified as attempting to recruit a sample of individuals with subjective 
memory problems would have been very difficult given the time and resources 
available. Although it is acknowledged that individuals presenting with subjective 
memory problems may potentially interpret reductions in metamemory differently to 
individuals without  these difficulties and this is potentially something that would 
need to be explored in future research.  
There are a number of participant factors that could potentially limit the 
generalisability of the findings within older adult and MCI samples. Due to the lack 
of a standardised approach to clinical diagnosis and diagnostic uncertainty of MCI 
(Smith & Bondi, 2013), it was important to have clear inclusion and exclusion 
criteria to establish MCI status. In this study participants entered into the MCI 
condition were required to have received an MCI diagnosis within the last 6 months 
by the referring clinician and be adjudged to score 0.5 on the CDR (Morris, 1993) as 
well as meeting Petersen (2011) criteria for MCI. This criteria is well established in 
the research literature (Stephan et al., 2013). The use of such a stringent criteria 
adopted in the current study,, while standardising participant severity levels it 
nevertheless contributed to challenges with recruitment of this population. Given 
such it may have meant that not all clinicians would have felt confident in 
approaching potential participants and paradoxically may have reduced the 
heterogeneity of the sample in ways that are unhelpful. 
The older adult sample was comprised of current and former carers of people 
with dementia. This group was chosen as previous research suggests such 
individuals may be a particularly vulnerable group, given that fear of dementia is 
particularly pronounced in individuals with personal experience of caring for 
someone with dementia (Suhr & Kinkela, 2007). This may however potentially 
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overestimate concerns and anxiety within the sample, limiting its generalisability 
more generally to the older adult population. Alternatively, it may be that people 
with subjective memory difficulties, who would be expected to be particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of repeated checking and a group of particular interest for 
study, differ from the wider population of non-clinical community-dwelling older 
people who have not attended a memory clinic for their own concerns regarding 
memory.  
To increase the representativeness of the sample, recruitment was conducted 
across multiple sites and carers were recruited from both memory clinics and 
voluntary carer groups. However as both samples required clinicians to identify 
potential participants, this may potentially have led to some selection bias with 
clinicians being more likely to identify less “stressed” or anxious carers or 
individuals with MCI, however it may be that this anxiety moderates the effect of 
repeated checking. Within both samples potential confounding factors were 
accounted for, including the exclusion of individuals with presentations that may 
impact on memory performance and the use of baseline measures to assess potential 
confounders between experimental groups to include as covariates in the analysis. 
4.2.3 Randomisation and Blinding 
To limit the effect of potential selection bias participants were randomly 
allocated to each experimental condition (relevant and irrelevant checking) with the 
order of training phase (stove-dosette box/dosette box-stove) counterbalanced 
between participants. The randomisation was conducted by a UEA staff member 
independent of the research using random permutated blocks and held in two sets of 
sealed envelopes. These were held by an independent researcher who was contacted 
during the research assessments to reveal the allocation. This procedure ensured that 
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the researcher conducting the assessments was blind to allocations prior to consent 
being obtained which maintained the internal validity of the study. 
4.2.4 Statistical Power 
Power calculations were used to determine the number of participants needed 
to detect significant findings for memory accuracy as well as for metamemory 
variables. Estimates of effect size were taken from studies investigating the effect of 
repeated checking in non-clinical student samples. Due to challenges with recruiting 
samples from these populations, this sample size was not achieved in either the older 
adult or MCI samples. It is therefore possible that larger sample sizes may have been 
needed to detect significant differences in memory accuracy following repeated 
checking seen in other studies investigating repeated checking (Medway & Jones, 
2013; Radomsky et al., 2006). It is also important to note that low power also 
reduces the likelihood that statistically significant results reflect a true effect (Button 
et al., 2013), therefore these results need to be interpreted with some caution, which 
is reflected in the choice of statistics and comparisons made between MCI and older 
adult samples. 
4.2.5 Measures 
This study utilised robust, reliable and valid questionnaires to measure 
baseline characteristics including symptoms of anxiety, depression and subjective 
ratings of prospective and retrospective memory failure. In addition an item was 
adapted from the FADS (French et al., 2012) and used to divide the sample into high 
and low apprehension about developing Alzheimer’s disease to explore the impact of 
this construct. The use of a single question and likert scale response is common 
within studies investigated anxiety of developing dementia (French et al., 2012; 
Kessler et al., 2012). A single item was favoured over a more detailed measure of 
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this construct due to the lack of measures validated for use with individuals with 
MCI (French et al., 2012; Kessler et al., 2012), as well as for pragmatic reasons as 
currently there are no brief measures of dementia worry. The measurement of 
outcome variables (metamemory, memory accuracy and memory source) in this 
study were adapted from those used by Radomsky and colleagues (2006; 2014) in 
their series of experiments measuring the effects of repeated checking using a real 
stove within a laboratory based setting. This was important as one of the aims of the 
study was to attempt to replicate this paradigm within a new population using an 
adapted task procedure. The measure of memory accuracy commonly used within 
this paradigm focuses on the specific recall of which three stoves were checked on 
the previous trial. The use of three items was designed to increase task complexity 
enough to create opportunity for doubt over a simple action within a timeframe that 
would be acceptable for research participants, and as such only provides an 
approximation of the nature of checks that individuals may undertake. Despite 
multiple items being checked, memory accuracy is still close to ceiling and there is 
little variation in responses, however it is important to note that although a more 
complicated memory accuracy task would increase potential variation it would also 
reduce ecologically valid. As planned data analysis using MANOVA could not be 
attempted, analysis of memory accuracy was instead based on the method used by 
van den Hout & Kindt (2003a; 2003b; 2004) who analysed the proportion of 
participants who accurately identified which knobs had been checked during the last 
checking trial rather than the number of correct responses. 
The measure of metamemory variables was assessed using scales from 0 – 
100 with participants being asked to rate their memory confidence, vividness and 
detail for their last check. These scales were relatively quick and simple for 
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participants to complete and therefore allowed for the measurement of multiple 
constructs following a single check, however there are a number of limitations to 
their use and it is possible the use of more detailed questionnaires to measure these 
constructs may provide different results. There is likely to be a ceiling effect between 
pre- and post-checking trials for high confidence individuals if their first rating is 
100%, this means the measure while likely to capture a decrease in metamemory is 
unlikely to detect any further increase between checks. It is also possible to question 
the validity of the measures used in this paradigm, for example the measure of 
confidence in this experiment has been demonstrated in a number of other studies to 
differ from confidence in the outcome of the check (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; 
2003b; 2004), which was not measured in this study, but has been shown to be 
unaffected by this paradigm. Similarly, the extent to which participants really 
understand the distinction between memory vividness and detail is unclear. This may 
explain why these variables have been shown to be highly correlated and included as 
part of a wider construct of metamemory rather than analysed as separate constructs 
in previous research (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; Radomsky et al., 2006). It may 
be given the high number of variables in this study, that participants may be more 
likely to repeat previous ratings when making judgements on constructs they deem 
as similar or related, which may mean that the order in which these measures are 
administered may influence participant responses. 
4.2.6 Experimental Task Procedure 
The task used in this study was adapted from a well established paradigm 
(van den Hout 2003a; Radomsky et al., 2006) used with non-clinical student 
populations. There is currently no evidence to suggest that there is a differential 
effect when tested within clinical populations (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; 
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Radomsky et al., 2014). A particular strength of this study is the novel adapted 
version of the paradigm using a non-functioning model stove using knobs taken from 
a working stove and dosette box task. The majority of studies investigating this 
effect have made use of the original van den Hout and Kindt (2003a; 2003b; 2004) 
computerised stove task (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Medway & Jones, 2013). 
To improve the ecological validity of this task Radomsky, Gilchrist and Dussault, 
(2006) adapted the paradigm to be used in a laboratory setting using a real stove. To 
reduce the potential for visual checking of the stove between trials Radomsky and 
colleagues (2006) used a single removal knob, although acknowledged that there was 
no way to limit the potential for participants to engage in mental checking. However 
the use of a single knob somewhat paradoxically reduces the ecological validity of 
this task and arguably makes the task more difficult, which may explain the 
statistically significant reductions in memory accuracy seen within their study. The 
task used in present study therefore attempted to increase the ecological validity by 
using all 6 stove knobs. A further benefit of this method is that it is easily 
transportable and allows the paradigm to be tested with a harder to access population 
who may find transport to a university laboratory either challenging or 
unmanageable. The development of the model stove and dosette box was preferred 
to using the participants own stove and tap as this would lead to significant variation 
between testing materials. 
Van den Hout & Kindt, (2003a) performed an intricate series of experiments 
to demonstrate that effects found were not due to experimental artifacts related to the 
testing procedure, while Medway and Jones (2013) demonstrated that the reduction 
in metamemory remains even following a short delay. However importantly a 
potential confounding variable not measured by this paradigm is performance during 
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both relevant and irrelevant checking trials. Although all participants complete 15 
trials of relevant or irrelevant checking, attention and concentration may fluctuate 
and vary between different participants depending on how easy or difficult they find 
the checking task. If the tasks are unequal in their difficulty one group may be more 
bored so pay less attention, or have made mistakes so feel less confident about their 
performance. 
The task procedure used within this study included 15 checks rather than the 
20 checks used within the majority of studies testing this paradigm (van den Hout 
2003a; Radomsky et al., 2006), it is possible that although significant reductions in 
metamemory have been demonstrated following as few as 5-10 checks (Coles et al., 
2006), it remains possible that further repeated checking trials may be required to see 
reductions in memory accuracy. As with other experiments using a real stove 
(Radomsky et al., 2006; 2014) participants completion of checking trials was 
monitored, however care was taken by the researcher not to comment, provide verbal 
or visual feedback or answer questions once the experiment had begun. However to 
further limit the potential impact of the presence of the researcher on the participant, 
future research using this paradigm may wish to explore other forms of 
communication for instructions to be given to participants. 
An important factor that needs to be considered in interpreting the findings of 
this study is the extent to which the paradigm represents the difficulties that may be 
faced by older people and individuals with MCI. It is likely that this paradigm differs 
from the idiosyncratic checking that may be used by individuals with memory 
concerns, however this is balanced against the practicalities of creating an 
experimental paradigm that is acceptable to research participants. This study 
represents an important first step to exploring the boundaries of this effect with older 
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people and individuals with MCI and how they may differ from non-clinical student 
populations. It will be important for future research to explore whether decreased 
memory confidence persists after a delay in older adults and particularly in 
individuals with MCI, as well as whether the cumulative effects of repeated checking 
are the same if there is an interval between checks which may be expected if 
repeated use of object such as calendars and dosette boxes were also to increase 
doubt. 
4.3 Theoretical Implications of the Findings 
These findings provide further support to the growing evidence base 
experimentally showing that repetition of checking paradoxically induces doubt and 
reduces confidence in memory (Radomsky et al., 2006; van den Hout & Kindt 
2003a; 2003b; 2004). As well as replicating that reductions in memory confidence, 
vividness and detail can be achieved in fewer than the 20 checking trials originally 
used in van den Hout and Kindt’s (2003a) computerised stove task (Coles et al., 
2006; Radomsky & Alcolado; 2010). The results support the self-perpetuating 
mechanism proposed in Rachman’s (2002) theory of compulsive checking, 
demonstrating the deleterious effects of repeated checking on vividness and detail as 
well as evidencing the change in source of memory from “remembering” to just 
“knowing” predicted by van den Hout & Kindt (2004). Most intriguingly, these 
findings expand on previous work by demonstrating reductions in metamemory 
following repeated checking within both an older adult and MCI sample. This has 
potential wider implications for research with older people where memory concerns 
are particularly salient and hints at a role of this effect in fear of dementia and 
subjective memory concerns where anxiety around potential memory failures may 
lead to checking which further reduces memory confidence. 
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In addition, the current study replicated statistically significant reductions in 
metamemory following repeated checking (see section 3.5.1) found in studies using 
the original computerised stove task (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; 2003b; 2004) 
and the laboratory based functional stove task (Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 
2006), using a novel non-functional stove analogue and dosette box task. This 
paradigm adapted the existing research protocol (Radomsky et al., 2006; 2014), for 
use in a naturalistic environment which served a number of functions, notably it 
allowed for an analogue procedure consistent with this paradigm to be easily 
transported to participants’ homes, which has allowed participants who otherwise 
would have found transport to a fixed laboratory setting too challenging to 
participate. A further advantage is that this has potentially increased ecological 
validity by allowing for the use of tasks considered more representative of checking 
by older people and people with memory difficulties.  
However it is important to note that this study failed to find evidence to 
support the findings of Radomsky et al., (2006; 2014) of statistically significant 
reductions in memory accuracy following repeated relevant checking compared to 
irrelevant checking (see section 3.5.2). A potential limitation of this methodology is 
that because a non-functional stove is used, it does not create a real sense of threat 
(Radomsky et al., 2006). However given the concerns regarding memory 
performance that become increasing common in older people (Jorm et al., 1994), it is 
hypothesised that the potential for a perceived memory failure over a seemingly 
simple task would provide comparable threat within an older adult or MCI 
population. An alternative hypothesis is that changes observed in memory accuracy 
may be due to the relative complexity and difficulty of the tasks used. Therefore 
while the study may generally be underpowered to detect this effect due to its small 
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sample size, it may also be due to changes in the paradigm, however further research 
using this paradigm is required to test this hypothesis. 
4.4 Clinical Implications of the Findings 
Although caution is required when interpreting the findings because of study 
limitations, particularly in relation to sample size and the currently unknown 
boundaries of the repeated checking effect. It will be important for future research to 
address these limitations so that differences can be understood of how repeated 
checking may differentially affect older adults, individuals with subjective memory 
problems and individuals with MCI. The findings show significant reductions in 
memory vividness and detail for older adults following repeated relevant checking 
and that even within small samples a robust effect of change in memory confidence 
following repeated relevant checking was found in the MCI and older adult samples 
(see section 3.5.1).  
Given that low confidence in memory is common in older adults (Wells & 
Esopenko, 2008) and individuals with MCI (Frank et al., 2006) and has been shown 
to linked to significantly higher levels of doubt and urges to check (Cuttler et al., 
2013). The current findings have some potentially important clinical implications, as 
they demonstrate that older people both with and without memory impairment (MCI) 
can experience doubt following repeated checking. Medway and Jones (2013) 
demonstrated in a non-clinical population that  
checking is not necessary for these effects to occur as repeated use without the 
“checking” also results in significant declines in memory accuracy, confidence, 
vividness and detail. 
This suggests that low confidence specific to frequently used objects may begin to 
develop before repeated checking behaviour occurs. 
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Taken together these findings suggest that reductions in metamemory 
following either checking or the use of frequently-used objects such as locking doors 
or turning off taps should be relatively common. This implies that key to whether an 
individual begins checking is likely how episodes of forgetting are interpreted. 
Within the current study individuals with MCI were significantly more likely to 
report anxiety about developing dementia than older people without impairment (see 
section 3.2). Anxiety about developing dementia appears to share some 
characteristics with the cognitive model of health anxiety (Warwick & Salkovskis, 
1990), potentially leading to the development of unhelpful coping strategies such as 
checking and affecting their likelihood of interpreting memory lapses as evidence of 
dementia (Kessler et al., 2012). 
The findings of this study have clear implications for the assessment and 
formulation of memory problems. For example there may be benefits in clinicians 
routinely asking questions about the use of strategies such as checking or the use of 
memory aids such as calendars and dosette boxes. Linked to this may be benefits to 
asking questions to establish if the patient experiences anxiety about developing 
dementia or how they interpret everyday memory mistakes such as not being able to 
“remember” if they shut the door. There may be simple interventions that may lessen 
distress in clients who experience doubt following checking including the use of 
psychoeducation of the problems of repeated checking and normalising these 
experiences or adapting the stove paradigm into a behavioural experiment to test out 
the usefulness of repeated checking.  
4.5 Future Research 
This was the first study to investigate the effects of repeated checking on 
memory accuracy and metamemory for older people with and without cognitive 
 86 
impairment (MCI), as such further research will be required to better understand this 
relationship as well as providing opportunities to address the limitations of this 
research. Future research should attempt to address the boundaries of the repeated 
checking effect in relation to people with MCI and explore the external validity of 
this paradigm. The stove paradigm utilises a fairly complex procedure with multiple 
checks being completed over a short period of time to provide an approximation of 
an individual’s experience of repeated checking (van den Hout 2003a; Radomsky et 
al., 2006). Coles et al. (2006) showed significant reductions in metamemory occur 
after as few as five to ten relevant checking trials, however as yet no studies have 
attempted to simplify the procedure using more ecologically valid checking items 
and tasks such as a dosette box or checking dates onto a calendar.  
Perhaps most importantly for individuals with memory complaints will be 
examination of the length of time reductions in memory confidence, vividness and 
detail last and if there is a cumulative effect after a delay in repeated checking. 
Currently only one study has tested the delayed effects of repeated checking, 
Medway and Jones (2013) found statistically significant reductions in memory 
confidence, vividness and detail between relevant and irrelevant checking conditions 
had persisted after an 8 minutes of performing a distraction task. Finally, promising 
research suggests attenuation may provide a possible intervention to ameliorate the 
effects of familiarity resulting from repeated checking. Boschen, Wilson and Farrell 
(2011) found using a computerised stove task with perceptually changing stimuli, in 
this case stimuli which would change colour every five trials, did not lead to 
statistically significant differences in memory confidence, vividness and detail 
between relevant and irrelevant checking conditions. However for this to be applied 
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to a clinical population, such as individuals with cognitive impairment, this would 
need to be tested in more naturalistic settings using more ecological valid stimuli. 
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Appendix A: G-Power Screen Shot for 2x2 MANOVA 
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Appendix B: G-Power Screen Shot for 2x2 ANOVA 
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Appendix C: Stove Training Phase Diagram 
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Appendix D: Relevant Checking Series: Stove 
PRE-TRIAL:  
Please turn on burners 2, 5, 1-------------------Please turn them off-----------------------Please 
check them. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
“Now, I’m going to give you some instructions to operate and check the replica stove the way 
you were shown earlier”. 
 
T1. Please turn on burners 5, 4, 6----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T2. Please turn on burners 3, 2, 6----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T3. Please turn on burners 4, 5, 2----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T4. Please turn on burners 3, 1, 5----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T5. Please turn on burners 2, 6, 4----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T6. Please turn on burners 4, 6, 5----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T7. Please turn on burners 2, 4, 1----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T8. Please turn on burners 2, 1, 3----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T9. Please turn on burners 5, 4, 1----------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T10. Please turn on burners 2, 6, 5---------------Please turn them off--------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T11. Please turn on burners 2, 5, 1---------------Please turn them off--------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T12. Please turn on burners 4, 2, 3---------------Please turn them off--------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T13. Please turn on burners 3, 6, 1---------------Please turn them off--------------------Please 
check them. 
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T14. Please turn on burners 6, 2, 4---------------Please turn them off--------------------Please 
check them. 
 
T15. Please turn on burners 4, 3, 6---------------Please turn them off--------------------Please 
check them. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
POST TRIAL: 
Please turn on burners 1, 3, 6---------------------Please turn them off---------------------Please 
check them. 
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Appendix E: Irrelevant Checking Series: Dosette Box 
PRE-TRIAL:  
Please turn on hobs 2, 5, 1----------------------Please turn them off------------------------Please 
check them. 
 
 
 
 
“Now, I’m going to give you some instructions to check the dosette box the way you were 
shown earlier.” 
 
T1.  Please open Saturday noon--------------------------Remove the capsule---------------------
----------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T2.  Please open Tuesday morning ----------------------Remove the capsule--------------------
------------ 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T3.  Please open Thursday morning ---------------------Remove the capsule--------------------
------------ 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T4.  Please open Sunday bed ------------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T5.  Please open Wednesday noon ----------------------Remove the capsule---------------------
----------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T6.  Please open Thursday bed-----------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T7.  Please open Friday morning---------------------------Remove the capsule------------------
-------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T8.  Please open Sunday evening--------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T9.  Please open Monday bed------------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T10.  Please open Tuesday evening-------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
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T11.  Please open Wednesday bed--------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T12.  Please open Sunday noon------------------------------Remove the capsule------------------
-------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T13.  Please open Friday evening----------------------------Remove the capsule------------------
-------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T14.  Please open Tuesday noon-----------------------------Remove the capsule------------------
-------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
T15.  Please open Saturday evening------------------------Remove the capsule-------------------
------------- 
Please close the lid----------------------------------Please perform the check. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 “Now, I’d like you to operate the stove.” 
 
POST TRIAL: 
Please turn on hobs 1, 3, 6----------------------Please turn them off------------------------Please 
check them. 
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Appendix F: Clinical Dementia Rating Scale (CDR) 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
Score the impairment when decline is due to cognitive loss not impairment from other causes: 
 
1. Memory 
0 no memory loss or slight inconsistent forgetfulness 
0.5 consistent slight forgetfulness; partial recollection of events; "benign" forgetfulness 
1 moderate memory loss; marked for recent events; defect interferes with everyday activities 
2 severe memory loss; only highly learned material retained; new material rapidly lost 
3 severe memory loss; only fragments remain 
 
2. Orientation 
0 fully orientated 
0.5 fully orientated except for slight difficulty with time relationships 
1 moderate difficulty with time relationships; orientated to place at examination; may have geographic 
disorientation elsewhere 
2 severe difficulty with time relationships; usually disorientated to time, often to place 
3 orientated to person only 
 
3. Judgement and Problem Solving 
0 solves everyday problems and handles business and financial affairs well; judgement good in relation to 
past performance 
0.5 slight impairment in solving problems, similarities and differences 
1 moderate difficulty in handling problems, similarities and differences; social judgement usually maintained 
2 severely impaired in handling problems, similarities and differences; social judgement usually impaired 
3 unable to make judgements or solve problems 
 
4. Community Affairs 
0 independent function at usual level in job, shopping and volunteer and social groups 
0.5 slight impairment in these activities 
1 unable to function independently in these activities although may still be engaged in some; appears normal 
to casual inspection 
2 appears well enough to be taken to functions outside of the family home; unable to function independently 
outside of home 
3 appears too ill to be taken to functions outside of family home; unable to function independently outside of 
home 
 
5. Home and Hobbies 
0 life at home, hobbies and intellectual interests well maintained 
0.5 life at home, hobbies and intellectual interests slightly impaired 
1 mild but definite impairment of function at home; more difficult chores abandoned; more 
complicated hobbies and 
2 only simple chores preserved; very restricted interests, poorly sustained 
3 no significant function in home outside of own room 
 
6. Personal Care 
0 fully capable of self-care 
0.5 fully capable of self-care 
1 needs prompting 
2 requires assistance in dressing, hygiene and keeping of personal effects 
3 requires much help with personal care; frequent incontinence 
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Assigning the Clinical Dementia Rating 
There are two methods of combining the domain scores to give the overall CDR.  
The domain scores can either be summed to give the CDR-SB (Sum of Boxes) 
score, or an algorithm can be used as follows: 
 
The global CDR score is derived from the scores in each of the six categories. 
Memory (M) is considered the primary category and all others are secondary.  CDR 
= M if at least three secondary categories are given the same score as memory.  
Whenever three or more secondary categories are given a score greater or less than 
the memory score, CDR equals the score of the majority of secondary categories 
that are on whichever side of M has the greatest number of secondary categories.  If 
there are ties in the secondary categories on one side of M, the CDR score closest 
to M is chosen. 
 
When M = 0.5, CDR = 1 if at least three of the other categories are scored one or 
greater.  
If M = 0.5, CDR cannot be 0; it can only be 0.5 or 1.  If M = 0, CDR = 0 unless there 
is questionable impairment in two or more secondary categories, in which case CDR 
= 0.5. 
 
 Score 0 0.5 1 2 3 
 
CDR 0 –No 
Dementia  
CDR 2 –  
Moderate 
Dementia
 Scor 0 0. 1 2 3  Scor 0 0. 1 2 3 M      
 M       M      
 O       O      O      
 JPS       JPS      
 C       C      JPS      
 HH       HH      
 PC       PC      C      
              
 
HH      
 
CDR 0.5 –  
Questionable 
Dementia 
 
CDR 3 –  
Severe Dementia 
 Scor 0 0. 1 2 3  Scor 0 0. 1 2 3 PC      
 M       M      
       O       O      
 JPS       JPS      
 C       C      
 HH       HH      
 PC       PC      
Mark in only one box for each 
category.  To assign the CDR, see 
grids on the right.  Shaded areas 
indicate defined range within which 
the scores of individual subjects 
must fall to be assigned a given               
  
 
CDR 1 –  
Mild Dementia 
 
 
Scor
e 
0 0.
5 
1 2 3  
 M       
 O       
 
 JPS       
       C       
 HH       
  
 PC       
 
                    
Clinical Dementia Rating 
(circle) 
 
0 0.5 1 2 3 
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Appendix G: Geriatric Anxiety Inventory short form (GAI-SF) 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
Please read the following questions. 
Please circle your response for each question.  
 
 
 
 
1 
 
I worry a lot of the time 
 
AGREE 
 
DISAGREE 
 
2 
 
Little things bother me a lot 
 
AGREE 
 
DISAGREE 
 
3 
 
I think of myself as a worrier 
 
AGREE 
 
DISAGREE 
 
4 
 
I often feel nervous  
 
AGREE 
 
DISAGREE 
 
5 
 
My own thoughts often make me 
nervous 
 
AGREE 
 
DISAGREE 
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Appendix H: 5-item Geriatric Depression Scale (5 item GDS) 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
Please read the following questions. 
Write down your answers.  
To each question answer YES or NO. 
 
 
 YES or NO 
 
1 
 
Are you basically satisfied with your life? 
 
 
2 
 
Do you often get bored? 
 
 
3 
 
Do you often feel hopeless? 
 
 
4 
 
Do you prefer to stay at home rather than going out 
a doing new things? 
 
 
5 
 
Do you feel pretty worthless the way you are now? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'No' in Q1 and 'yes' in Q2-5 score 1. 
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Appendix I: 6-item Cognitive Impairment Test (6-CIT) 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
 
 
1. What year is it? 
 
Correct - 0 points 
Incorrect - 4 points 
 
 
2. What month is it? 
 
Correct - 0 points 
Incorrect - 3 points 
 
 
3. Give the patient an address phrase to remember with 5 components, 
e.g. John, Smith, 42,High St, Bedford 
 
 
4. About what time is it (within 1 hour) 
 
 
 
Correct - 0 points 
Incorrect - 3 points 
 
 
5.Count backwards from 20-1 
 
 
 
Correct - 0 points 
1 error - 2 points 
More than one error - 4 points 
 
 
6. Say the months of the year in reverse 
 
Correct - 0 points 
1 error - 2 points 
More than one error - 4 points 
 
 
7. Repeat address phrase 
 
Correct - 0 points 
1 error - 2 points 
2 errors - 4 points 
3 errors - 6 points 
4 errors - 8 points 
All wrong - 10 points 
 
 
6-CIT Total score:            /28 
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Appendix J: The Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ) 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
In order to understand why people make memory mistakes, we need to find 
out about the kinds of mistakes people make, and how often they are made in 
normal everyday life. We would like you to tell us how often these kinds of 
things happen to you. 
Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box. 
Please make sure you answer all of the questions on both sides of the sheet 
even if they don’t seem entirely applicable to your situation. 
Please answer all of the questions as accurately as possible 
 
 Very 
Often 
Quite 
Often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
Do you decide to do 
something in a few minutes’ 
time and then forget to do 
it? 
     
Do you fail to recognise a 
place you have visited 
before? 
     
Do you fail to do something 
you were supposed to do a 
few minutes later even 
though it’s there in front of 
you, like take a pill or turn 
off the kettle? 
     
Do you forget something 
that you were told a few 
minutes before? 
     
Do you forget appointments 
if you are not prompted by 
someone else or by a 
reminder such as a 
calendar or diary? 
   
 
 
  
 124 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 Very 
Often 
Quite 
Often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
Do you fail to recognise a 
character in a radio or 
television show from scene 
to scene?  
 
     
Do you forget to buy 
something you planned to 
buy, like a birthday card, 
even when you see the 
shop?  
 
     
Do you fail to recall things 
that have happened to you 
in the last few days?  
 
     
Do you repeat the same 
story to the same person on 
different occasions?  
 
     
Do you intend to take 
something with you, before 
leaving a room or going out, 
but minutes later leave it 
behind, even though it’s 
there in front of you?  
 
   
 
 
  
Do you mislay something 
that you have just put down, 
like a magazine or glasses?  
 
     
Do you fail to mention or 
give something to a visitor 
that you were asked to pass 
on?  
 
     
Do you look at something 
without realising you have 
seen it moments before?  
 
     
If you tried to contact a 
friend or relative who was 
out, would you forget to try 
again later?  
 
     
Do you forget what you 
watched on television the 
previous day?  
 
     
Do you forget to tell 
someone something you 
had meant to mention a few 
minutes ago?  
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Appendix K: Item adapted from The Fear of Alzheimer's Disease Scale (FADS) 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
Please rate the extent to which you would agree with the statement below. Indicate 
your answer by circling the appropriate box. 
 
I think that I will probably get Alzheimer’s disease, and it frightens me. 
  
Strongly  
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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Appendix L: Demographic Information Sheet 
 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
Age: _______ years 
 
 
Gender:  M F 
 
 
Ethnicity:       
 
 
Marital Status:       
 
 
Highest qualification achieved:       
 
 
Current/previous occupation:         
 
 
 
Thinking about both the good and bad things that make up your life, how 
would you rate your quality of life as a whole? 
Poor Fair Good Excellent 
 
 
How would you rate your physical health? 
 
Poor 
 
Fair Good Excellent 
 
 
 
Current Medications:  
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Appendix M: Response Sheet: Pre-Checking 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
1. Which three knobs did you check on the last trial, and in which order?  
  
(Please indicate your answer on the following diagram by marking an “1” for first 
item checked, a “2” for second item checked, and a “3” for third item checked in 
the appropriate spots). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. On a scale of 0-100 where 0 means “not at all” and 100 means “extremely”, 
how would you rate: 
 
- Your confidence in your answers to question 1 overall?      _______ 
  
- The vividness (e.g. clarity, intensity) of your memory of the last checking trial:  ________ 
 
- The detail (e.g. particular visual features) in your memory of your last checking trial:    
   _  ______ 
 
 
3. Please read the following: 
 
“Knowing” the knobs are all off means that you have a general sense that they are 
off.  Even if you do not have a concrete detailed memory, you just know they are 
turned off. For example, your memory of tying your shoes this morning is probably 
“known” as opposed to “remembered”. 
 
“Remembering” the knobs are turned off means you can go through your memory 
and bring up the detailed process (with specific features) of turning them off. For 
example, your memory of meeting me for the first time today is probably 
“remembered” as opposed to just “known.” 
 
Once the above distinction is clear, please answer the following: 
  
      Think about the last trial and indicate by circling below which kind of memory best 
applies.  
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“remembering”               “knowing” 
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Appendix N: Response Sheet: Post-Checking 
 
Participant Identification Number __________________ 
 
1. Which three knobs did you check on the last trial, and in which order?  
  
(Please indicate your answer on the following diagram by marking an “1” for first 
item checked, a “2” for second item checked, and a “3” for third item checked in 
the appropriate spots). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. On a scale of 0-100 where 0 means “not at all” and 100 means “extremely”, 
how would you rate: 
 
- Your confidence in your answers to question 1 overall?      _______ 
  
- The vividness (e.g. clarity, intensity) of your memory of the last checking trial:  ________ 
 
- The detail (e.g. particular visual features) in your memory of your last checking trial:    
   _  ______ 
 
 
3. Please read the following: 
 
“Knowing” the knobs are all off means that you have a general sense that they are 
off.  Even if you do not have a concrete detailed memory, you just know they are 
turned off. For example, your memory of tying your shoes this morning is probably 
“known” as opposed to “remembered”. 
 
“Remembering” the knobs are turned off means you can go through your memory 
and bring up the detailed process (with specific features) of turning them off. For 
example, your memory of meeting me for the first time today is probably 
“remembered” as opposed to just “known.” 
  
Once the above distinction is clear, please answer the following: 
  
      Think about the last trial and indicate by circling below which kind of memory best 
applies.  
 
“remembering”               “knowing” 
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Appendix O: Ethical approval  
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Appendix P: Participant Information Sheet 
The effects of repeated checking on memory 
 
 
Invitation to participate in a research study 
You are being invited to take part in a research study which is being conducted as 
part of my Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. Before you decide, it is important for you 
to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
some time to read the following information carefully and do not hesitate to ask 
questions if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study will aim to investigate whether checking is a helpful or unhelpful strategy 
for people both with and without memory concerns. Many people with memory 
concerns engage in checking in an attempt to remove doubt about completion of 
tasks, or to remove uncertainty because of concerns about memory performance. 
However recent research has suggested checking may in fact lead to increased 
doubt. This may be particularly important for individuals with memory difficulties 
where increased doubt may undermine confidence in their abilities. We will therefore 
be looking to compare the impact of checking memory in people both with and 
without memory difficulties. The results of the study will hopefully help us to better 
advise those with memory difficulties on the benefits or problems of checking as a 
strategy to aid memory. 
Who is being invited to take part? 
We hope to recruit people with and without memory concerns/difficulties to help us 
understand the impact of memory checking. If you agree to take part in our study we 
will assign you to the appropriate group, in this way we will be able to compare the 
differences between the groups. The first group will be adults who experience some 
difficulties with their memory and have a diagnosis of mild cognitive impairment 
(MCI). The second group will be individuals over 60 years old who do not currently 
experience difficulties with memory. Participants must also be able to complete some 
tasks as part of the study and be able to answer questions in English. 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation is voluntary and it is completely up to you to choose whether or not to 
take part. If after reading this information sheet, you do decide to take part, you will 
be asked to sign a consent form to show that you are happy to participate in the 
study. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without 
giving a reason. A decision to not take part or to withdraw will not affect the standard 
of care you receive within the NHS. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part in the study, a researcher will meet with you either at your 
home or an alternative location, if you would prefer. Following discussion of any 
questions you may have and completion of the consent form, you will be instructed 
on how to operate a non functioning replica stove and how to check a dosette box. 
You will then be asked to perform a series of checking tasks. Following this, you will 
be asked some questions and complete a small package of questionnaires relating 
to your memory and mood.  In total, this will take approximately 1 hour to complete. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
We will ask for your permission to send your GP a letter explaining that you have 
agreed to take part in the study. All information that is collected about you during the 
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course of the study will be kept confidential and will only be seen by members of the 
research team. However if you were to disclose information that may result in either 
you or anyone else being put at risk of harm, there may be a need to break this 
confidentiality and inform individuals involved in your care (either the professional 
who referred you to the study or your GP). 
All data is stored without any identifying details under secure conditions. All paper 
copies of the questionnaire booklets will be kept in a locked drawer and any 
information that we enter on a computer will be password protected. Once the study 
is completed, all of the information will be stored in a locked drawer at the University 
of East Anglia for 10 years, in line with UEA Research Data Management Policy, 
after which it will be securely destroyed.  
What will happen to the results? 
The information collected will be reported in my doctoral thesis, which will possibly 
be edited for publication in an academic journal. No participants will be identified in 
any publication arising from the study. 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
Previous research suggests checking can increase doubt for whether or not an 
action has been completed, therefore some uncertainty in memory is normal and 
would be expected during these activities. You will also be asked some questions 
about memory, which some people can find difficult to talk about when they are 
experiencing a problem with their memory. Although this is not expected, if you do 
feel distressed at any point during the study, you can withdraw from it without having 
to give a reason. If you do feel distressed during or after the research, you can 
discuss this with me or my supervisor. Alternatively, you may wish to contact your 
local General Practitioner (GP). 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Although there are no direct benefits to taking part in the study, its results will 
hopefully improve our understanding of the use of checking as a strategy for those 
with memory concerns and help us to better advise individuals who experience 
difficulties with memory. 
Complaints 
If you are unhappy about any aspect of your participation, we will do our best to 
resolve any concerns you may have. However if you remain dissatisfied and wish to 
make a complaint about the way you have been approached or treated during the 
course of this study, the normal National Health Service complaints procedures are 
available to you by contacting the Patients’ Advice and Liaison Service (PALS).  
Patients’ Advice and Liaison Service (PALS).  
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust, Hellesdon Hospital, Drayton High Road, 
Norwich, Norfolk, NR6 5BE  
Telephone: 0800 279 7257  
Email: PALS@nsft.nhs.uk 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All NHS research is looked at by an independent group, called a Research Ethics 
Committee, to protect your safety, rights, well-being and dignity. This study has been 
reviewed and been given a favourable opinion by (reviewing body will be inserted 
once confirmed) Research Ethics Committee. 
Further information and contact details 
If you have any further queries about the study or if you are interested in being 
informed of the study findings, then please contact either myself or my supervisor 
using the contact details below: 
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Prof. Ken Laidlaw (Professor of Clinical Psychology/Programme Director 
ClinPsyD) 
Department of Clinical Psychology,  
Norwich Medical School,  
Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences,  
University of East Anglia,  
Norwich Research Park;  
Norwich, NR4 7TJ.  
E-mail: K.Laidlaw@uea.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research study! 
Miles Lattimer (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
Department of Clinical Psychology,  
Norwich Medical School,  
Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences,  
University of East Anglia,  
Norwich Research Park;  
Norwich, NR4 7TJ.   
E-mail: M.Lattimer@uea.ac.uk 
Telephone: 07561 346 673 
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Appendix Q: General Practitioner Letter 
 
 
 
The effects of repeated checking on 
memory 
 
 
NAME (DOB: ) has been invited and consented to take part in a research study.  
Please let us know if there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more 
information.  
 
This project is run by Miles Lattimer who is a Trainee Clinical Psychologist based at 
University East Anglia (UEA) as part of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the influence of checking behaviour on 
individuals both with and without Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). Many people 
engage in checking in an attempt to feel certain, however previous research has 
suggested that checking can lead to increased doubt. Further research is needed to 
see whether this is the case for people with memory problems, where increased 
doubt may further undermine confidence in their abilities. The study will therefore 
aim to explore whether repeated checking is a helpful or unhelpful strategy for 
people both with and without memory difficulties. 
 
Participants were asked to perform a series of checking tasks involving a non 
functioning replica stove and a dosette box. Following this, they were asked some 
questions and completed a small package of questionnaires relating to memory, 
cognition and mood.  In total, this took approximately 1 hour to complete. 
 
The information collected will be reported in my doctoral thesis, which will possibly 
be edited for publication in an academic journal. The information collected in the 
study will be anonymous and patients will not be identified in any publication arising 
from the study. 
 
Participation in this study will not affect the patient’s standard of current or future 
treatment.   
 
This study has been reviewed and been given a favourable opinion by the NRES 
East of England – Essex Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet.  Please do not hesitate to contact me if 
you need any further information. 
 
Miles Lattimer 
Department of Clinical Psychology,  
Norwich Medical School,  
Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences,  
University of East Anglia,  
Norwich Research Park;  
Norwich, NR4 7TJ 
 
Email: M.Lattimer@uea.ac.uk 
 
< GP Address > 
< Date > 
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Kind regards, 
 
 
 
Miles Lattimer 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix R: Consent Form 
 
Participant Identification Number for this trial __________________ 
Name of Researcher:________________ 
 
The effects of repeated checking on memory 
 
 
Please put your initials in the boxes below if you agree with the following statements 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet (Version X) for the  
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information,  
ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
(Please put your initials in the box, if you agree.) 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical  
care or legal rights being affected. 
 
(Please put your initials in the box, if you agree.) 
 
3. I give permission for my GP to be informed of my participation in the  
study. 
 
(Please put your initials in the box, if you agree.) 
 
4. I understand that all information given by me or about me will be  
treated as confidential by the research team. 
 
(Please put your initials in the box, if you agree.) 
 
5. I agree to take part in the study.  
 
(Please put your initials in the box, if you agree.) 
 
 
 
Name of participant        Date        Signature 
 
 
_______________________       ___________       _____________________ 
 
Name of person taking consent       Date        Signature 
 
 
_______________________       ___________       _____________________ 
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Appendix S: Follow Up Information Sheet 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  
 
This study was designed to look at memory confidence in individuals both with and 
without Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). Previous research (using undergraduate 
students who were asked to check a stove) suggests that repeated checking of the 
same thing over and over again, will lead to reduced confidence in that particular 
memory as well as lower detail and vividness, while memory accuracy does not 
seem to be affected. In this experiment, we had some participants repeatedly check 
a replica stove while others were asked to check a dosette box or pill organiser. 
Following this, both groups were asked to check the replica stove for one trial. 
 
Our prediction is that the group who were asked to check the replica stove many 
times will report lower confidence in their memory for the final check of the stove 
than the group who were asked to repeatedly check the dosette box. We are also 
expecting the group who repeatedly checked the stove to rely more on “knowing” 
that they performed the check rather than being able to “remember”.  
 
It is our hope that your help will enable us to develop better memory aids and to 
better advise individuals who have been diagnosed with MCI or who experience 
difficulties with memory. It is important to note that many people experience different 
levels of confidence and memory for a variety of things and that many participants 
have difficulty remembering the specific details of this task. 
 
If you would like further information, have any questions or concerns about the study, 
or if you are interested in being informed of the study findings, then please contact 
either myself or my supervisor: 
 
 
 
Miles Lattimer (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
School of Medicine, Health Policy, and Practice. UEA, Norwich, NR4 7TJ.  
E-mail: M.Lattimer@uea.ac.uk 
 
Prof. Ken Laidlaw (Professor of Clinical Psychology/Programme Director 
ClinPsyD) 
School of Medicine, Health Policy, and Practice. UEA, Norwich, NR4 7TJ.  
E-mail: K.Laidlaw@uea.ac.uk 
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Appendix T: Telephone Script 
The effects of repeated checking on memory 
 
Script 1: Interest in Participating 
“Hello Mrs/Mr/Ms _____ (Participant Name) 
My name is _____ (Researcher Name), I’m calling with regard to the Effects of 
Repeated Checking on Memory research study. I understand from _____ (Clinician 
Name) that you’re interested in receiving more information about the research 
study?” 
(If the person does not recognise the research study, briefly remind them about the 
study, (see ‘Yes’ below) and how they provided their contact details, health 
professional they spoke to etc) 
 
 
YES       NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Good. The purpose of the study is to 
investigate whether repeated checking is a 
helpful or unhelpful strategy for people who 
experience some difficulties with memory. 
Many people check in an attempt to feel 
certain, although previous research has 
suggested that checking can increase 
doubt. We want to look at whether this is the 
case for people with memory problems. To 
do this we will be comparing people both 
with and without memory difficulties. 
What I can do is send you a Participant 
Information Sheet in the post, give you 
some time to read it over and then I can 
phone you a few days after that to answer 
any questions you might h 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“That’s no problem, thank you for your 
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Script 2: Appointment booking 
“Hello Mrs/Mr/Ms ______ (Participant Name) 
My name is ______ (Researcher Name), I’m calling with regard to the Effects of 
Repeated Checking on Memory research study. I phoned you ______ (Time period, 
e.g. last week). 
(If the person does not recognise the researcher or recall any phone call, briefly run 
through contact with them so far) 
                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         YES                                                                               NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions about the following topics should be answered using the wording 
below.  
“Have you received our 
Participant Information Sheet? “ 
“Oh dear, I do apologise. Could I just 
check we’ve got your contact details 
correct? OK, thank you. Would you 
like me to send the Participant 
Information Sheet again? Good, they’ll 
be in the post to you today. Thank you 
for your time Mrs/Mr/Ms ______ 
(Participant’s Name), I will ring you 
sometime next week OK? Bye for 
now.” 
“Good. Have you had a chance to read 
them?” 
“Thank you for taking the time to read 
them. Did you have any questions?” 
(Questions answered by the researcher) 
“ 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation is voluntary and it is completely up to you to choose whether or not to take 
part. If you do decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form to show that 
you are happy to participate in the study. You are free to withdraw at any time without 
giving a reason and a decision to withdraw or not to take part, will not affect the standard 
of care you receive within the NHS. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part in the study, I will meet with you either at your home or an 
alternative location, if you would prefer. Following discussion of any questions you may 
have and completion of the consent form, you will be asked to perform a series of 
checking tasks using a non functioning replica stove and a dosette box. You will be then 
be asked some questions and complete a small package of questionnaires relating to your 
memory and mood.  In total, this will take approximately 1 hour to complete. 
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




 
                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES                                                                                     NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
I will ask for your permission to send your GP a letter explaining that you have agreed to 
take part in the study. All information that is collected about you during the course of the 
study will be kept confidential, unless I was concerned that you might be at risk of harming 
yourself or other people, then I would need to break this confidentiality and talk to 
someone involved in your care, either a health worker at your service or your GP, to 
inform them of this. I would try to discuss this with you first if that did happen. 
What will happen to the results? 
All data is stored without any identifying details under secure conditions. The paper copies 
of the questionnaire booklets will be kept in a locked drawer and any information that we 
enter on a computer will be password protected. Once the study is completed, all of the 
information will be stored in a locked drawer at the University of East Anglia for 10 years, 
in line with UEA Research Data Management Policy, after which it will be securely 
destroyed.  
The information collected will be reported in my doctoral thesis, which will possibly be 
edited for publication in an academic journal. You would not be identifiable in any 
publication arising from the study. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All NHS research is looked at by an independent group, called a Research Ethics 
Committee, to protect your safety, rights, well-being and dignity. This study has been 
reviewed and been given a favourable opinion by the NRES East of England – Essex 
Research Ethics Committee. 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
Previous research suggests checking can increase doubt for whether or not an action has 
been completed, therefore some uncertainty in memory is normal and would be expected 
during these activities. You will also be asked some questions about memory, which some 
people can find difficult to talk about when they are experiencing a problem with their 
memory. Although this is not expected, if you do feel distressed at any point during the 
study, you can withdraw from it without having to give a reason. If you do feel distressed 
during or after the research, you can discuss this with me or my supervisor. Alternatively, 
you may wish to contact your local General Practitioner (GP). 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Although there are no direct benefits to taking part in the study, its results will hopefully 
improve our understanding of mild cognitive impairment and help us to better advise 
individuals who experience difficulties with their memory. 
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“Good. What I’d like to do now is to 
arrange a convenient date and time to 
visit you.” 
“At the visit, if you are still happy to 
participate and following completion of a 
consent form, you will be asked to 
perform a series of checking tasks 
involving a non functioning replica stove 
and a dosette box. You will then be 
asked some questions relating to your 
memory and mood.  It should take around 
1 hour to complete. Is that all OK?” 
“Great, would you prefer to meet at your 
home or at an alternative location? The 
experiment requires a quiet area with no 
distractions and a flat surface such as a 
table on which to place the stimuli.” 
“Okay, would any of these dates/times be 
convenient for you?” 
“Good. I look forward to seeing you then.” 
“That’s no problem, thank you for your 
time.” 
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Appendix U: Experimental Procedure Script 
The effects of repeated checking on memory 
 
 
***These instructions should be given following the signing of the consent form and the 
call to determine randomised assignment for STOVE/DOSETTE BOX order in the 
training phase, as well as RELEVANT or IRRELEVANT checking conditions*** 
 
 “First I will show you how to operate and check the stove and the dosette box after which I 
will ask you to complete a series of these operations. Following this, you will be asked some 
questions and asked to complete some questionnaires. As we discussed, you have the right to 
withdraw from participating at any time, without any negative consequences. Any 
questions?” 
 
“Before we start I’d like to emphasise that there are a lot of operations to go through, but no 
“tricks” or “surprises” are involved. Alright, let’s begin.” 
 
TRAINING PHASE:  
 
***STOVE/DOSETTE BOX order determined by randomised assignment*** 
 
(STOVE) 
*Introduce stove stimulus* 
 
“These are the six knobs that you will be operating that correspond to the 6 stove tops. 
(pointing at the relevant knobs and stove tops) We will refer to them as numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6. You will be operating knobs in sets of threes at any given time. For example, if I asked 
you to turn burners 1, 3 and 2 on, you would turn the corresponding knobs from the off mark 
a quarter turn to the right (where the knob will point to the “3” on a standard clock), like this 
(demonstration). When asked to turn them off, you simply turn them counter-clockwise back 
to the off-mark (demonstration). When asked to check them, you should wiggle the knob to 
make sure it is in place properly, like this (demonstration).” 
 
“It is important to go through the procedure of wiggling and checking the knobs properly 
because the knobs are sometimes easily mistaken as off when they really are not.” 
 
“Would you like me to repeat that, or is it okay to continue?” 
 
*Repeat instructions if required* 
 
“Let’s have a practice. Please turn on burners 4, 5 and 6. Please turn them off. Please check 
them.” 
 
*If the participant makes an error correct them and demonstrate how to perform the check 
correctly* 
 
*Remove stove stimulus* 
 
 
(DOSSETTE BOX)  
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*Introduce dosette box stimulus* 
 
“This is the dosette box, the days of the week, Sunday to Saturday, are labelled along the top 
and each compartment is labelled either morning, noon, evening or bed. Each compartment 
contains a capsule. When asked to open a compartment, for example Saturday bed, you 
would do so by opening the lid like this (demonstration). When asked to remove the capsule, 
you take the capsule from the compartment (demonstration).  When asked to close the lid, 
you simply close the lid like this (demonstration). When asked to perform the check, you 
open the relevant compartment to make sure the right capsule was removed and then close it, 
like this (demonstration).” 
 
“It is important to go through the procedure of opening and checking the compartments 
because you cannot see inside and they need to be opened to be checked.” 
 
“Would you like me to repeat that, or is it okay to continue?” 
 
*Repeat instructions if required* 
 
“Let’s have a practice. Please open Sunday morning. Remove the capsule. Please close the 
lid. Please perform the check.” 
  
*If the participant makes an error correct them and demonstrate how to perform the check 
correctly* 
 
*Replace capsule and remove dosette box stimulus* 
 
 
PRE-TRIAL:      
*Introduce stove stimulus* 
 
“Alright, I am now going to give you some instructions on the checks I’d like you to perform. 
I will pause until you have completed that part of the instruction but will not be able to give 
you any feedback from this point. Any questions?” 
 
*Administer PRE-TRIAL on appropriate sheet (Relevant Checking Series: Stove/ 
Irrelevant Checking Series: Dosette Box) based on their condition* 
 
*Remove stove stimulus* 
 
“Now I’d like you to answer this sheet of questions.  When you’re finished, just let me 
know.” 
 
*Give Response Sheet: Pre-Checking* 
 
 
RELEVANT/IRRELEVANT CHECKING: 
 
***RELEVANT/IRRELEVANT CHECKING determined by randomised assignment*** 
 
 “Alright, we will now start the sets of operations. There will be many operations to go 
through, and it is important to go through the actual physical procedure. Any questions?” 
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(RELEVANT CHECKING) 
*Introduce stove stimulus* 
 
“Now, I’m going to give you some instructions to operate and check the replica stove the way 
you were shown earlier”. 
 
*Administer Trials T1 – T15 (Relevant Checking Series: Stove)* 
 
 
OR 
(IRRELEVANT CHECKING) 
*Introduce dosette box stimulus* 
 
“Now, I’m going to give you some instructions to check the dosette box the way you were 
shown earlier.” 
 
*Administer Trials T1 – T15 (Irrelevant Checking Series: Dosette Box)* 
 
*Remove dosette box stimulus. Introduce stove stimulus* 
 
“Now, I’d like you to operate the stove.” 
 
 
POST TRIAL: 
*Administer POST TRIAL on appropriate sheet (Relevant Checking Series: Stove/ 
Irrelevant Checking Series: Dosette Box) based on their condition* 
 
*Remove stove stimulus* 
 
“Now I’d like you to answer this sheet of questions.  When you’re finished, just let me 
know.” 
 
*Give Response Sheet: Post-Checking* 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRES: 
 “Now, I’d like you to answer these questionnaires. There are no right or wrong answers. Just 
answer the questions at your own pace without spending too much time on any one question. 
When you’re finished, just let me know. Any questions?” 
 
*Give Questionnaire Pack (containing 5-item GDS, GAI-SF, PRMQ and the item 
adapted from the Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale)* 
 
“Finally, I have some questions I’d like to ask. The first set will be a brief cognitive screen 
which looks at memory, orientation and attention and the second set will be demographic 
questions. Do you have any questions?” 
 
*Administer 6-CIT and Demographic Information Sheet* 
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FOLLOW UP INFORMATION: 
“Thank you for taking part in this study, please read this follow up information sheet” 
 
*Give Follow Up Information Sheet* 
 
“Do you have any other questions or comments about anything you did today or anything 
we've talked about?” 
 
 “If you do have any further questions about the study please feel free to contact either myself 
or my supervisor using the details on the follow up information sheet. Thank you again for 
your time.”  
 
  
 
